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Abstract
A core prediction of recent “dual-self” models is that risk attitudes depend on self-
control. While these models have received a lot of attention, empirical evidence
regarding their predictions is lacking.We derive hypotheses from three prominent
models for choices between risky monetary payoffs under regular and reduced
self-control. We test the hypotheses in a lab experiment, using a well-established
ego depletion task to reduce self-control, and measuring risk attitudes via finely
graduated choice lists. Manipulation checks document the effectiveness of the de-
pletion task. We find no systematic evidence in favor of the theoretical predictions.
In particular, depletion does not increase risk aversion.
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1. Introduction
A decision maker’s attitude toward risk is a core component of her “economic per-
sonality”. Risk preferences are an integral part of theoretical models in virtually
all domains of economics, and empirical evidence documents that risk attitudes
are an important predictor of both economic and health outcomes. For instance,
a higher willingness to take risks is positively correlated with being self-employed,
investing in stocks, and not having insurance, as well as being a smoker, drink-
ing heavily, and being overweight (Anderson and Mellor, 2008; Barsky et al., 1997;
Dohmen et al., 2011; Kimball et al., 2008).
Given the central role of risk attitudes in economic theory and their predictive
power for individual behavior, a better understanding of factors that potentially
influence risk attitudes is of great importance to economists. Inspired by the dif-
ficulty of expected-utility theory to explain empirical phenomena like the Allais
paradox or small-stakes risk aversion, various recently developedmodels build on
insights frompsychology and posit that risk attitudes are shaped by the interaction
of “dual systems” (a deliberative and an affective system, respectively; Loewen-
stein and O’Donoghue, 2005; Mukherjee, 2010) or of “dual selves” (a long-run and
a short-run self; Fudenberg and Levine, 2006, 2011, 2012). In this framework, “self-
control” amounts to the long-run self imposing restrictions on the short-run self.
Consequently, a crucial determinant of a decision maker’s risk attitude is her cur-
rent level of self-control resources. In particular, the prominent Fudenberg–Levine
model predicts that lower levels of self-control induce stronger risk aversion for
stakes within a particular range.
In this paper, we derive three explicit hypotheses on the relationship between
self-control and risk preferences, using the model by Fudenberg et al. (2014), a ver-
sion of the Fudenberg–Levine model that is particularly well-suited to address de-
cisionmakingunder risk in the caseofpairwise lottery choice. Thehypotheses refer
to choices among pairs of two-outcome lotteries, choices among a safe payoff and
two-outcome lotteries (all paid out immediately), and to choices among pairs of
two-outcome lotteries that will only be paid out with a delay. We adopt a fourth hy-
pothesis directly from Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2005); their model predicts
that self-control depletion leads tomore pronounced probability weighting (p. 28).
From the similar dual-self model byMukherjee (2010) we derive a set of alternative
predictions. We test these hypotheses in a laboratory experiment.
The purpose of the experiment is to provide causal evidence on the link be-
tween self-control and risk preferences. We exogenously manipulate the level of
self-control between subjects using ego depletion, a concept from psychology
(Baumeister et al., 1998). In doing so, we also provide sound empirical evidence
regarding the effect of ego depletion on risk attitudes.
Our experiment uses a between-subject design with two conditions. At the be-
ginning, subjects in the treatment group perform a so-called ego depletion task
that is well-established in the literature and has been found to induce low self-
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control in numerous studies (see the meta-analysis by Hagger et al., 2010). Deple-
tion tasks are based on the notion that the exertion of self-control in one activ-
ity consumes self-control resources, thereby increasing self-control costs in sub-
sequent activities (Baumeister et al., 1998). The control group performs a similar,
though nondepleting task, i.e., a task that does not reduce self-control resources.
Immediately following the respective task, we obtain precise measures of sub-
jects’ risk attitudes. Our measures are based on finely graduated choice lists, one
for each of the four hypotheses derived from Fudenberg et al. (2014) and Loewen-
stein andO’Donoghue (2005); they also allow for testing the alternative predictions
based on Mukherjee (2010). Each row of the choice lists consists of a choice be-
tween two two-outcome lotteries. Inspired by Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006)
and Ebert andWiesen (2014), we chose one lottery to be amean-preserving spread
of the other, with a sure payoff (a risk premium) being added or subtracted. A note-
worthy feature of this method is that it allows quantifying subjects’ risk attitudes
without assuming a specific utility function. This is particularly important in our
case, since the Fudenberg–Levine model contains several functions of unknown
parametric form as well as unobservable, difficult-to-estimate quantities.
Contrary to the predictions that we derive from the Fudenberg–Levine model,
wedonotfindanyevidence for increased risk aversionafter egodepletion. For all of
our four choice lists, subjects in the depletion group even exhibit a nonsignificant
tendency toward less risk-averse choices, compared to the control group. Also evi-
dence in favor of the fourth hypothesis (taken fromLoewenstein andO’Donoghue,
2005) that reduced self-control leads to more pronounced probability weighting is
limited at best. Neither do we find support for the alternative predictions derived
from the model by Mukherjee (2010).
We do not observe that subjects behave in a more random manner under de-
pletion. Depleted subjects also do not decide more quickly, as one would expect
if they relied on heuristics to a stronger extent. Finally, self-control as a character
trait (as opposed to the temporary level of self-control resources) does not explain
heterogeneity of risk attitudes across individuals.
Overall, we deem our empirical results on the apparently weak link between
self-control and risk attitudes informative for the futuremodeling of decisionmak-
ing under risk. In principle, we have no doubt that economics can benefit from in-
corporating psychological concepts in general and self-control in particular. Just
as much, we acknowledge the potential of dual-self models to explain behavior
in neighboring areas like intertemporal choice and economic theories of addic-
tion.However, different levels of self-control donot seem to influence risk attitudes
strongly—and if they do, the influence is primarily in the opposite direction of the
prediction of the most prominent applicable model. This casts doubt on the “uni-
fied explanation” offered by Fudenberg and Levine (2006).
Taking a broader perspective, our paper adds to a recently emerging field of
research that investigates whether aspects of the decision environment that go be-
yond incentives and constraints—such as self-control, cognitive load, emotions,
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or stress—influence decisionmaking under risk.1 A common feature of this line of
research is that it challenges the standard assumption of stable preferences (which
has shaped economics since Stigler andBecker, 1977). Our results provide evidence
that self-control does not belong to the aspects of the decision environment that
induce large variations in risk preferences; hence, the standard view of stable pref-
erences may be adequate at least with regard to risk preferences and self-control.
Related literature
Traditionally, economics has modeled decision makers without any reference to
psychological concepts like “self-control”. However, in some cases, the standard
models of economic choice—expected-utility theory and the discounted-utility
model—have difficulties explaining observed behavior both in the field and in the
laboratory. To remedy these problems, numerous theoretical models have been
developed recently which capture the notion that some economic decisions may
involve a competition between conflicting motives. Resolution of the conflict de-
pends on the use of “self-control” (e.g., Gul and Pesendorfer, 2007; Dekel et al.,
2009).
In particular, models involving “multiple selves” or “multiple systems” have be-
come increasingly popular in economics. These “selves” or “systems” are either
conceived of as diverging motives held by a decision maker at different points
in time (e.g., Laibson, 1997; Diamond and Kőszegi, 2003; Heidhues and Kőszegi,
2009) or as conflictingmotives that are present in a decisionmaker simultaneously
(e.g., Loewenstein and O’Donoghue, 2005; Brocas and Carrillo, 2008; Fudenberg
and Levine, 2006, 2011, 2012; Fudenberg et al., 2014). While themost common appli-
cation of these models is temporal discounting, the dual-self model by Fudenberg
and Levine (2006, 2011) as well as the “dual-system” models by Loewenstein and
O’Donoghue (2005) and Mukherjee (2010) also explicitly address decision making
under risk.
A particular strength of the model by Fudenberg and Levine is that it offers
a “unified explanation” (Fudenberg andLevine, 2006, p. 1449) for several commonly
observed discounting-related phenomena such as time inconsistency as well as
risk-related phenomena such as the Rabin paradox2 (Rabin, 2000) and the Allais
paradox (Allais, 1953).More specifically, a core prediction of the Fudenberg–Levine
model is that lower levels of self-control induce more risk-averse behavior for
1 For instance, the results of Cohnet al. (2015), Guiso et al. (2014), Schulreich et al. (2014), and Schul-
reich et al. (2016) are based on emotional priming and suggest that sadness and fear induce stronger
risk aversion. By contrast, the results of Conte et al. (2016) indicate that sadness, fear, anger, and jovi-
ality induce risk-seeking behavior. Benjamin et al. (2013), Deck and Jahedi (2015), and Gerhardt et al.
(2016) find that cognitive load increases risk aversion. Concerning stress, Kandasamy et al. (2014) find
that induced stress increases risk-averse behavior, while Buckert et al. (2014) observe stronger risk
proclivity for gains, however only for a relatively small subgroup of participants.
2 This paradox refers to the observation that the levels of small-stakes risk aversion observed in
laboratory experiments are too high to be reconciled with behavior for higher stakes when assuming
that decision makers care only about final wealth.
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stakes within a specific range. However, empirical evidence on this particular rela-
tionship between self-control and risk attitudes is scarce. This paper aims at pro-
viding the first direct test of a central prediction of the Fudenberg–Levine model.
Fudenberg and Levine (2006, p. 1467), Fudenberg et al. (2014, p. 66), and espe-
cially Fudenberg and Levine (2012, p. 3) motivate characteristics of their dual-self
model by referring to the so-called “strengthmodel” of self-control. Thismodelwas
introduced to the psychology literature by Baumeister et al. (1998). The strength
model is based on the idea that exerting self-control consumes self-control re-
sources that can be depleted. As a consequence, use of self-control in one task re-
duces the availability of self-control resources in a subsequent task. This process
is referred to as “self-control depletion”, “willpower depletion”, or “ego depletion”
(in analogy to the Freudian ego that controls the id). The strength model has also
found its way into the economics literature. Not only does it serve as the basis of
the models by Fudenberg and Levine (2012) and Ozdenoren et al. (2012); it is also
part of the motivation of the analysis of resource allocation in the human brain by
Alonso et al. (2014).
The foundations and implications of the strength model of self-control have
been empirically investigated by both psychologists and economists numerous
times (see Hagger et al., 2010, Carter and McCullough, 2014, Hagger et al., 2016, for
extensive overviews andmeta-analyses; see Bucciol et al., 2011, 2013, for economic
applications). Yet, regarding the link between ego depletion and risk attitudes, the
existing evidence is scarce and inconclusive.Moreover, none of the existing papers
is tailored to testing the predictions of the Fudenberg–Levine dual-self model or
the models by Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2005) and Mukherjee (2010). Unger
and Stahlberg (2011) find that depleted subjects make more risk-averse decisions,
based on the results of a strongly framed investment experiment. Since Unger and
Stahlberg instructed subjects to imagine that they were managers making a deci-
sion on behalf of their firm, subjects’ decisions in this experiment do not neces-
sarily reflect only their own individual risk preferences. Measuring risk attitudes
via choice lists, but with a total sample size of only N = 54 in a between-subject
design, Stojić et al. (2013) find that subjects tend to be more risk-averse under
ego depletion—however, not significantly so. By contrast, Friehe and Schildberg-
Hörisch (2017) find that depleted subjects tend to be less risk-averse than nonde-
pleted subjects. Theirmeasure of risk attitudes, however, only captures risk-averse
up to risk-neutral behavior and does not cover the domain of risk proclivity.3
3 There are someadditional, less closely related studies. Combiningprior losses and egodepletion
in a single treatment, Kostek and Ashrafioun (2014) find a higher degree of risk aversion. In contrast,
two psychological studies (Bruyneel et al., 2009; Freeman and Muraven, 2010) find increased “risk
taking” under ego depletion. These use, however, either (unincentivized) vignettes or tasks with un-
known probabilities, such that subjects decided under ambiguity instead of risk. De Haan and van
Veldhuizen (2015) used, by contrast, incentivized, risky gambles. They also observe a reduction of risk
aversion after depletion. However, the observed effect is not only small but also present in just one
out of their three experiments, and de Haan and van Veldhuizen cannot rule out that it was caused
by depleted subjects choosing more randomly (p. 59).
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The experimental method perhapsmost closely related to willpower depletion
is putting subjects under concurrent cognitive load while they make decisions.
Cognitive load usually takes on the form of working-memory load. So far, three
studies have investigated the relationship between individual risk attitudes and
cognitive load: in Benjamin et al. (2013) and in Deck and Jahedi (2015), the working-
memory load manipulation was remembering a 7-digit number, while it was re-
membering a spatial arrangement of dots in Gerhardt et al. (2016). All three studies
consistently find a significant increase in risk aversiondue to cognitive load. At first
glance, these findings seem to contradict the findings of our study, but at closer in-
spection they do not.
While closely related, willpower depletion and cognitive load are not identical.
Baumeister and Vohs (2016b, p. 70) see the crucial difference in that ego depletion
targets self-regulation,while cognitive loadaffectsattention. This view is supported
by the results of Maranges et al. (2017). A similar distinction is made by Kahneman
(2011, p. 43): “Ego depletion is not the same mental state as cognitive busyness.”
He posits that “unlike cognitive load, ego depletion is at least in part a loss of mo-
tivation” (pp. 42/43). If one wanted to frame it in terms of dual-system thinking,
ego depletion could be interpreted as shifting the balance of power between the
affective “System 1” and the deliberative “System 2” in favor of “System 1”, while
cognitive load rather seems to influence the contents of “System 2”. Hence, it is not
clear that the twomanipulations should have the same effect.
Moreover, as Gerhardt et al. (2016, p. 27) note, the stake sizes in their study are
so low that the Fudenberg–Levine model is unlikely to predict any effect. Thus, it
is unlikely that the particular channel envisioned by Fudenberg and Levine (2006,
2011) can account for the observed increase in risk attitudes caused by cognitive
load. From the point of view of Gerhardt et al. (2016), cognitive load probably in-
fluences risk attitudes through a different channel.
Our study goes beyond the existing literature in that it tests the role of self-con-
trol guided by the theoretical frameworks of Fudenberg and Levine (2006), Loewen-
stein and O’Donoghue (2005), and Mukherjee (2010). Additionally, we provide par-
ticularly clean evidence regarding the effect of ego depletion on risk attitudes. For
this purpose, several aspects of the design of our experiment are crucial. We use
(i) incentivized choices, (ii) ego depletion is the only manipulation, and (iii) all
probabilities associated with the payoffs are known to subjects. Our risk measure
(iv) covers the entire domain of possible risk attitudes and (v) enables us to detect
even small effect sizes. (vi) We take restrictions on the magnitude of the involved
payoffs, as they follow from the Fudenberg–Levine model, into account.
Moreover, we use several survey and behavioral responses of our subjects to
provide an independent manipulation check, showing that subjects in the treat-
ment group were more depleted than subjects in the control group.
Finally, our sample size (N = 308) yields sufficient statistical power to docu-
ment relevant effect sizes. The average effect size (Cohen’s d) is d = 0.62 in the
meta-analysis by Hagger et al. (2010) that is based on a total of 83 papers contain-
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ing 198 independent studies.Carter andMcCullough (2014) reevaluate the sameego
depletion literature. They find evidence for small-study effects which, when con-
trolled for, lead to lower estimates of the average effect size. In order not to fall prey
to this issue, our study features a comparatively large sample size (N = 308; this
exceeds the sample size of all but one of the 198 studies covered by Hagger et al.,
2010). Given our large number of observations, a power analysis shows that, using
a t-test and a significance level α= 0.05, we are able to detect, for each choice list
separately, an effect size as small as d = 0.32 at the conventional level of power of
80% or above.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the Fudenberg–
Levine model (2.1) and the hypotheses that we derive from the model regarding
the impact of reduced self-control on risk attitudes (2.2) as well as the hypothe-
ses based on Loewenstein andO’Donoghue (2005) (2.3) andMukherjee (2010) (2.4).
Section 3 describes the design andprocedural details of our laboratory experiment.
Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 discusses our findings and concludes.
2. Theory and hypotheses
In thepsychology literature, it has beenargued that depletion induces an increased
propensity to engage in risk-seeking behavior (Freeman and Muraven, 2010). The
dual-self model by Fudenberg and Levine (2006, 2011) makes the opposite predic-
tion: we should typically observe more pronounced risk aversion under depletion.
Fudenberg et al. (2014) explicitlymodel self-control as a determinant of choices be-
tween lotteries. Thus, theirmodel allows us to derive precise hypotheses regarding
the influence of ego depletion on pairwise lottery choice between two-outcome
lotteries (as we use in our experiment).
2.1. Overview of the model by Fudenberg et al. (2014)
In all variants of the Fudenberg–Levine model, decision making is the outcome
of the interaction of a short-run and a long-run self. One might think of the in-
teraction between the two selves as that of a “planner” (the long-run self) and
a “doer” (the short-run self), a terminology introduced by Thaler and Shefrin (1981).
Both “selves” have the same per-period utility function, which is assumed to be
monotonically increasing and concave. They differ, however, in the way they re-
gard the future. The short-run self is completely myopic, i.e., it cares only about
same-period consumption.4 Consequently, it prefers to spend all available income
immediately. Having a concave per-period utility function, the short-run self is
risk-averse. The long-run self, in contrast, also derives utility from consumption
in future periods and discounts them exponentially. Combined with its concave
per-period utility function, this creates a preference for smoothing consumption
over time. As a consequence of spreading consumption over a large number of pe-
4 In Fudenberg and Levine (2012), the authors allow for an only partially myopic short-run self.
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riods, the long-run self is (very close to) risk-neutral (for a formal derivation, see
Fudenberg and Levine, 2011, p. 44).
The short-run self’s preference for immediate consumption and the long-run
self’s consumption-smoothing motive generate a conflict of interest. By exerting
self-control, the long-run self can restrict the short-run self to a consumption level
below the latter’s desired consumption level. Importantly, in the model by Fuden-
berg and Levine, the described conflict of interest only arises for unanticipated in-
come. Anticipated income does not create a need to exert self-control: based on
foreseeable income, the long-run self allocates a budget to the short-run self of
each period, and the short-run selves spend exactly that budget.
Exertion of self-control when deciding over how to spend unanticipated in-
come is assumed to be costly. This cost increases in the difference between the
short-run self’s utility derived from the consumption that the long-run self “per-
mits” and the short-run self’s preferred course of action, i.e., spending the entire
period income immediately. To fit “the psychological evidence that self-control is
a limited resource” as well as to explain the Allais paradox, the self-control cost
function has to be convex, as Fudenberg and Levine (2006, p. 1467; 2011; 2012, pp. 3,
16) argue.
Fudenberg et al. (2014) develop a version of the Fudenberg–Levine model that
improves the model’s applicability to decision making under risk. Their main sim-
plifying assumption is linearity of the long-run value function. Thismeans that the
marginal utility of saving is constant, such that the long-run self is completely risk-
neutral (instead of being only very close to risk-neutral). In Section A, we use this
version of the Fudenberg–Levine dual-self model to formally derive Hypotheses 1,
2, and 3. In the following, we present the hypotheses and explain the intuition be-
hind them.
2.2. Hypotheses derived from Fudenberg et al. (2014)
Hypothesis 1. Ego depletion leads to greater risk aversion for choices between lot-
teries if at least one of the lotteries contains a small payoff below and another larger
payoff above a cutoff value zˆ.
zˆ denotes a threshold such that monetary lottery payoffs below zˆ are spent
completely, while any part of a payoff that exceeds zˆ is saved for future consump-
tion. The threshold zˆ is endogenously determined by the interplay of the long-run
self and the short-run self. It depends on the lottery under consideration, themenu
of lotteries as well as the marginal cost of self-control. Therefore, ego depletion—
which increases the marginal cost of self-control if the cost function is convex—
shifts the balance of power in favor of the risk-averse short-run self, resulting in
an increase in the degree of risk aversion expressed by the lottery choice. This is
due to two effects: First, for a given zˆ and a lottery with one payoff below and one
payoff above zˆ, the relative contributions of the short-run self’s and the long-run
self’s utility to the expected utility of this lottery change, with the effect that the
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combined preferences exhibit increased risk aversion (see Section A). Second, the
threshold zˆ increases. As a consequence, there are decisions which the short-run
self is entirely in charge of under depletion even though the long-run self would
have exerted self-control under nondepletion.
Hypothesis 2. The effect of ego depletion (i.e., increased risk aversion) is stronger
when one “lottery” is a sure payoff.
When the per-period utility function is concave, a sure payoff leads to higher
utility than a lotterywith the same expected value. Consequently, self-control costs
are higher in case the long-run self actually exerts control over the short-run self.
Compared to a decision among two two-outcome lotteries, this amplifies the in-
crease in risk aversion due to ego depletion (see also Fudenberg and Levine, 2011,
pp. 35, 46, 66).
Hypothesis 3. When payoffs are delayed, ego depletion has no effect.
In case we observe the effects of ego depletion that we predict in Hypotheses 1
and 2, these need not necessarily be caused by a decrease in self-control resources.
Other channels—for instance, a change in the propensity to rely on heuristics—
could generate the same effects. Our third hypothesis thus serves to distinguish an
influence of self-control from other possible explanations.
For this purpose, we exploit a particular feature of the dual-self model, namely
that the short-run self cares only about the current period. Although Fudenberg
and Levine (2006) do not specify the length of one period—i.e., the time horizon
for one short-run self—it should not exceed a few days: “the horizon of the short-
run self is on the order of a day to a week” (Fudenberg and Levine, 2011, p. 39).
Thus, when both lotteries exclusively feature payoffs that occur in the future—i.e.,
beyond the short-run self’s time horizon—self-control does not affect decisions.
Therefore, self-control costs or an increase in self-control costs will not make a dif-
ference for risk attitudes over future payoffs.5 If, however, ego depletion affected
risk attitudes through the increased use of heuristics, this would also be the case
for choices concerning the future. Thus, according to this alternative hypothesis,
we would find the same change in risk aversion when payoffs are delayed as when
they are immediate.
2.3. Hypothesis derived from Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2005)
Hypothesis 4. For a long shot, ego depletion leads to a lower degree of risk aversion.
A long shot is a lottery that offers a low probability of obtaining a high pay-
off and a high probability of obtaining a low payoff. These lotteries are sometimes
5 See also Fudenberg and Levine (2011, p. 48) for the implication that Allais-type paradoxes disap-
pear “if the results of gambles are delayed long-enough that they fall outside the time horizon of the
short-run self.”
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also referred to as “dollar bets”. Hypothesis 4 is based on the idea that the deci-
sionmaker overweights small probabilities and that this distortion becomesmore
pronounced under ego depletion. Overweighting the small probability of winning
a large amountmakes a long shot subjectively attractive despite its being relatively
risky. A stronger distortion of the small probability in the direction of½ under ego
depletion should thus make risk-averse decision makers less risk-averse, and risk-
seeking decision makers more risk-seeking.
Hypothesis 4 is a direct implication of Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2005,
p. 28). It deviates from the Fudenberg–Levinemodel in that Fudenberg and Levine
assume the absence of probability weighting and a strictly risk-averse short-run
self. The background of this hypothesis is empirical evidence that many subjects
exhibit risk proclivity for long shots (Harbaugh et al., 2010). A common explana-
tion for this phenomenon is probability weighting, in particular overweighting of
small probabilities that are associated with large payoffs (as modeled by cumula-
tive prospect theory, Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Probability weighting is mod-
eled explicitly as the outcome of the interaction of a deliberative and an affective
system by Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2005). In their model, the preferences of
the deliberative system can be represented by expected-utility maximization, i.e.,
the deliberative system takes probabilities at face value. In contrast, the affective
system assigns identical weight to all possible outcomes (i.e.,½ in the case of two-
outcome lotteries) instead of using the true probabilities. The interplay of both sys-
tems then results in an inverse-S-shaped probability weighting function. Loewen-
stein and O’Donoghue (2005, p. 28) explicitly state that “if a person’s willpower is
depleted . . ., then she should exhibit amore [inverse-]S-shaped probability weight-
ing function”. Thus, for long shots, we expect reduced risk aversion or increased
risk proclivity, respectively, under depletion, because attaching a higher probabil-
ity weight to the large payoffmakes picking the long shot more attractive.
2.4. Hypotheses derived fromMukherjee (2010)
Hypothesis 1 b. (Alternative to Hypothesis 1.) Ego depletion leads to increased risk
aversion when choosing between 50%-50% lotteries.
Hypothesis 2 b. (Alternative toHypothesis 2.) Ego depletion leads to increased risk
aversion when choosing between a 50%-50% lottery and a sure payoff.
Hypothesis 3 b. (Alternative toHypothesis 3.)Ego depletion also leads to increased
risk aversionwhen choosingbetween two50%-50% lotteries forwhich thepayoffs are
delayed.
Assuming that the strength of the affective system relative to the deliberative
system depends on self-control resources, we can also derive predictions for our
experiment from the model by Mukherjee (2010). According to this model, the af-
fective system replaces all original nonzero probabilities by a weight of 1/n (just
like in the model by Loewenstein and O’Donoghue, 2005), and it combines these
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with a concave value function (e.g., vA(x)= sgn(m)xm with m < 1). Note that the
combination of both effects can generate risk-averse as well as risk-neutral or risk-
seeking behavior. The deliberative system, by contrast, uses the correct probabili-
ties and combines them with a linear value function, i.e., it exhibits risk neutrality.
Total valuation is given by a weighted sum of the separate valuations by the affec-
tive and the deliberative system.
In combining the affectivewith the deliberative valuation, a parameterγ ∈ [0,1]
determines the relative strength of the affective system. As a consequence, a de-
crease in willpower—i.e., an increase in γ—affects risk attitudes through two si-
multaneous effects: a shift in probability weighting (in the direction of completely
uniform 1/n weighting) and a shift in the evaluation of the outcomes (in the direc-
tion of more strongly concave valuation).
This entails that the prediction regarding a weakening of willpower is straight-
forward for equal-probability gambles: for a 50%-50% two-outcome gamble, the
1/n weighting is exactly correct, so that both systems use the same, correct weight-
ing of probabilities. At the same time, the depletion-induced shift away from the
linear toward the concave value function leads to increased risk aversion. Hence,
themodel byMukherjee (2010) predicts the alternative Hypotheses 1 b, 2 b, and 3 b.
Hypothesis 4 b. (Alternative to Hypothesis 4.) For a long shot, there is greater vari-
ance of observed risk attitudes in the depleted group than in the nondepleted group
of subjects.
The model’s prediction for the “long shot” is a bit more involved. Since a de-
crease in willpower entails the two effects described above that potentially go in
opposite directions, the total effect depends on two factors: the exact probabilities
of the outcomes and the exact curvature of the affective system’s value function
(see Table 2 of Mukherjee, 2010, for an illustration). More precisely, depending on
the probabilities and outcomes, there is a curvature parameter m∗ such that for
m <m∗, the affective system exhibits risk aversion, and an increase in γ leads to
greater risk aversion of the total valuation. Conversely, for m >m∗, the affective
system exhibits risk proclivity, and an increase in γ leads to greater risk proclivity
of the total valuation. For m =m∗, both systems are risk-neutral, such that γ has
no effect.
Hence, subjects who are risk-averse for a long shot in a nondepleted state
shouldbecomemore risk-aversewhendepleted,while subjectswhoare risk-loving
when not depleted should become even more risk-loving when depleted. Finally,
depletion should have no effect for risk-neutral subjects. Assuming that there is
heterogeneity in subject’s baseline risk aversion, we should thus observe a greater
variance of risk attitudes in the depleted group. This leads to Hypothesis 4 b as
an alternative to Hypothesis 4.
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3. Experiment
3.1. General setup
Our objective is to test whether there is a causal effect of the current level of self-
control on risk attitudes.We employ abetween-subject designwith twogroups and
exogenously vary the level of self-control using an ego depletion task.6More specif-
ically, subjects in the depletion and in the control groupwork on different versions
of a task that bring about different levels of self-control capacity. Subsequently, we
measure subjects’ risk attitudes via incentivized choices between lotteries.
3.2. Depletion task
In our experiment, the depletion task serves as the source of exogenous variation
between subjects. Being such a vital part of the experiment, we required it to be
both well established and as effective as possible in inducing low self-control. The
taskof our choice, the crossing-out letters task,meets both criteria and is also easily
implementable in the lab. According to the meta-analysis of Hagger et al. (2010)
the crossing-out letters task is the most effective of all ego depletion tasks. It has
beenused successfully to induce changes in outcomes like persistence inwatching
a boring movie, resistance to persuasion, advice on risk taking given to others in
a vignette-style questionnaire, and offers made in a dictator or ultimatum game
(Baumeister et al., 1998;Wheeler et al., 2007; Freeman andMuraven, 2010; Achtziger
et al., 2015, 2016, respectively).
In the depletion group, the task works as follows. Subjects are first given
a printed text spanning 22 lines and are asked to cross out all instances of the letter
“e” (including the uppercase letter “E”). Subjects work on this task for three min-
utes. Immediately afterwards, subjects in the depletion group are given a different
text spanning 44 lines. This time they are asked to cross out all instances of the let-
ter “e” except when there is a vowel right after the “e” or two letters away (in either
direction). Subjects work on this second part of the task for sevenminutes. The ra-
tionale why this task depletes self-control is that it requires the constant cognitive
suppression of an automatic impulse—the impulse to cross out the letter “e” that
was built up in the first part of the task.
The task assigned to the control group also follows the standard of the litera-
ture. Subjects work on the same texts as the depletion group for the same dura-
tion but are only required to cross out all “e”s, without any additional rule, in both
parts. Hence, there is no self-control–consuming impulse suppression in the con-
trol group.
6 Awithin-subjectdesignwouldhavehad theadvantageofprovidinguswithabaselinemeasureof
risk attitudes at the individual instead of group level. However, wewould have needed to present sub-
jects the same lottery choices before and after the self-control manipulation. This would have been
a severe drawback because subjects are likely to remember their earlier choices. Paired with a prefer-
ence for consistency (Falk and Zimmermann, 2017), recalling previous choicesmight counteract any
depletion effect.
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We chose texts that we expected to be irrelevant and uninteresting tomost sub-
jects. The texts were based on the appendix of a statistics text book (Bamberg and
Baur, 2001) and describe criteria for the choice of statistics software in a very gen-
eral way. We provide the exact texts of the depletion task in Online Appendix C.
We deliberately chose not to pay subjects for this task because there is evi-
dence that receiving payment for a task counteracts ego depletion (Muraven and
Slessareva, 2003). In addition to announcingprivate feedback (to beprovided at the
end of the experiment), the instructions asked subjects to work on the task consci-
entiously. The data show that the vast majority of subjects did.7
3.3. Measure of risk attitudes
We used the following criteria to choose the method for quantifying subjects’ risk
attitudes:
• It does not require assuming a specific utility function or choice model.8
• Lotteries of various types, including long shots (lotteries with a low probabil-
ity of winning a high prize) and safe choices (degenerate lotteries), need to be
implementable.
• It has to allow for the measurement of risk aversion, risk neutrality, and risk
proclivity—ideally in a single decision situation.
• It should provide a fine measure of risk attitudes to enable us to detect small
effect sizes.
Following these criteria, we chose a measure using two-outcome lotteries
and mean-preserving spreads of these lotteries. Our method was inspired by
Ebert and Wiesen (2011, 2014) whose experimental measures are based on the
model-independent concept of risk apportionment (Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger,
2006). Ebert and Wiesen (2014) classify an individual as risk-averse if she prefers
a lottery L = (cL,1,pL,1;cL,2,pL,2) = (x− r,50%;x−k,50%) over the lottery M =
(cM ,1,pM ,1;cM ,2,pM ,2) = (x− r −k,50%;x,50%), where x, r , and k are monetary
payoffs. Note that this coincides with preferring a lottery to a mean-preserving
spread of that lottery. In case the individual prefers M over L, she is classified as
risk-seeking. In general—i.e., with arbitrary probabilities pL,1,pL,2—Lottery M is
constructed by setting cM ,1 = x− (pL,2/pL,1)r −k. This is needed for constructing
the mean-preserving spread of the long shot.
7 For the first paragraph of the first part of the task, 85% of subjects reported the correct value or
a value within the 10% interval around the correct value (typically below the correct value). This task
was the same for both groups. For the first paragraph of the second task, performance was compara-
ble for the control group (91% of subjects reported values inside the 10% interval around the correct
value), but inferior for the treatment group who had a more difficult task to fulfill (only 56% of sub-
jects stated values inside the 10% interval around the true value).
8 We deliberately did not aim at designing an experiment that enables us to estimate the models’
parameters. Structural estimation requires simultaneous estimation of several of themodels’ param-
eters. Any such estimationwould need to rely on strong assumptions regarding functional forms and
various unobservable quantities.
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Table 1
Overview of the choice lists presented to subjects.
Alternative A Alternative B
cA,1 pA,1 cA,2 pA,2 cB,1 pB,1 cB,2 pB,2
Choice List A: risky/risky (x = €22.00, r = €7.50, k = €11.50; 25 rows)
Top row €3.00 50% €22.00 50% €3.00 50% €7.00 50%
Center row €3.00 50% €22.00 50% €9.00 50% €13.00 50%
Row withm = 0 €3.00 50% €22.00 50% €10.50 50% €14.50 50%
Bottom row €3.00 50% €22.00 50% €15.00 50% €19.00 50%
Choice List B: safe/risky (x = €16.00, r = €5.00, k = €5.00; 19 rows)
Top row €11.00 100% €11.00 50% €21.00 50%
Center row €11.00 100% €6.50 50% €16.50 50%
Row withm = 0 €11.00 100% €6.00 50% €16.00 50%
Bottom row €11.00 100% €2.00 50% €12.00 50%
Choice List C: “long shot” (x = €14.00, r = −€36.00, k = €7.00; 21 rows)
Top row €7.00 90% €50.00 10% €7.00 90% €10.00 10%
Row withm = 0 €7.00 90% €50.00 10% €11.00 90% €14.00 10%
Center row €7.00 90% €50.00 10% €12.00 90% €15.00 10%
Bottom row €7.00 90% €50.00 10% €17.00 90% €20.00 10%
Choice List D: delayed payoffs (x = €18.00, r = €6.00, k = €8.50, paid in one week; 20 rows)
Top row €9.50 50% €12.00 50% €9.50 50% €24.00 50%
Above-center row €9.50 50% €12.00 50% €5.00 50% €19.50 50%
Below-center row €9.50 50% €12.00 50% €4.50 50% €19.00 50%
Row withm = 0 €9.50 50% €12.00 50% €3.50 50% €18.00 50%
Bottom row €9.50 50% €12.00 50% €0.00 50% €14.50 50%
Tomeasure the intensity of a subject’s risk attitude,we determine themonetary
amountm (compensation or “risk premium”) that is needed to make her indiffer-
ent between the lotteries L andM +m. To this purpose, we use a choice list format,
as introduced by Holt and Laury (2002). The switching row in the choice list deliv-
ers a proxy of the indifference-generating risk premiumm∼(L,M). Ifm∼(L,M)> 0,
the decisionmaker exhibits risk aversion for that particular lottery pair; conversely,
m∼(L,M)< 0 indicates risk proclivity.
Table 1 provides an overview of all four choice lists (one per hypothesis) that
we used, in the order in which they were presented to subjects: Choice List A is de-
signed to address Hypothesis 1, while Choice List B relates to Hypothesis 2, Choice
List C to Hypothesis 4, and Choice List D to Hypothesis 3.
We decided not to randomize the order of the choice lists since the most basic
hypothesis, Hypothesis 1, is addressed by Choice List A. We had all subjects com-
plete this choice list first to ensure that even if depletion effects fade out over a time
as short as aminute, they should be present consistently when testing ourmost ba-
sic hypothesis.
In the instructions we referred to the choice lists as “tables”. A sample screen-
shot displaying the exact representation that subjects saw is included in Fig. 1.
14
Each choice list starts from a first-order stochastically dominated choice and
spans risk aversion, risk neutrality, and risk proclivity. To make the decisions easy
for subjects to grasp, probabilities remain the samewithin a given choice list.More-
over, in all choice lists, the left lottery stays constant, while the right lottery’s payoff
changes in steps of €0.50 per row. Additionally, the expected value of “Alternative A”
is similar (between €10.75 and €12.50) for all four choice lists.
Toaddress a recent criticismof choice-list–basedmeasurementof risk attitudes
by Andersson et al. (2016), we put the expectedmedian switching row in the control
condition to the center of each list.9
Moreover, we balanced the exposition of our choice lists: in two of our choice
lists, the dominated choice in the first row is on the left, and in the other two, it is
on the right.
Obviously, there is a trade-off between the brevity of a choice list and the fine-
ness and extent of measurement. Some experimenters solve this by using differ-
ently sized increments, i.e., smaller increments in intervals they expect to be most
relevant. Since we were concerned that this might confound subjects’ choices by
steering the switching row in a certain direction, we used constant increments (of
€0.50) throughout all choice lists. To be able to pick up finer depletion-induced
changes in risk attitudes, switching points in four additional “small” choice lists
were elicited after subjects had made their choices in all four “large” choice lists.
These “small” choice lists consisted of six rows covering the switching range in the
respective “large” choice lists and had increments of €0.10. Importantly, one of the
rows of the “small” choice lists was randomly chosen for payment if and only if
the respective switching range of the associated “large” choice list had been se-
lected for payment. This ensures that subjects have no incentive to misrepresent
their preferences in the “large” choice lists in order to face lotteries with greater
expected value in the “small” choice lists.
A particular feature of our computerized implementation of the choice lists is
that, once a subject switches, all subsequent rows are automatically filled in. Sub-
jects could still adjust their choices andhad topress a “Continue”button to confirm
their choices before moving on to the next choice list. This was done to let as little
time as possible pass between the depletion task and themeasurement of risk atti-
tudes.While it is typically assumed that self-control resources replenish after some
time, we are not aware of any evidence on how long depletion effects last. Further-
more, we did not want to exhaust or annoy subjects, and thus possibly impair the
quality of our data, by forcing them to make 85 clicks.
9 Andersson et al. (2016) show that when subjects make mistakes that lead to random choice and
their “real” risk attitude does not imply a switching row at the center of a choice list, a systematic
measurement error toward indifference at the center of the choice list occurs. Thus, we designed our
choice lists in such a way that the switching row for the median risk attitude that we expected in the
control condition—on the basis of degrees of risk attitudes commonly observed in experiments—
was at the center of the respective choice list. It turns out that our expectations were rather accurate.
The median switching row in the control group was close to the center (one to three rows above the
center) for all choice lists.
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Fig. 1. Choice List (“Table”) A: risky versus risky.
Translation: “Please choose one alternative in each row. Alternative A [first row:] €3.00 with 50% or €22.00 with 50%. Alternative B [first row:] €3.00 with 50% or €7.00 with 50%.”
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A final aspect to consider is the value of zˆ in the Fudenberg-Levine model,
the theoretical threshold above which all additional income is saved. At least one
of the lotteries needs to be such that one outcome is above and one below zˆ. To
elicit a proxy for subjects’ individual zˆ values, we use two vignettes in the post-
experiment questionnaire. The vignettes asked subjects to imagine two scenarios.
The first scenario is going out with friends in the evening. The vignette asked sub-
jects to indicate the minimal amount of money spent while going out such that
they would consider the evening “expensive”. The second scenario is casually dis-
covering an item that one would like to buy in a store. It asks subjects to state the
minimal price of that item that would induce them to deliberate about the expen-
diture instead of buying the item immediately.
Median values in the two vignettes are €15 and €20, respectively. Thus, taking
these values as proxies for zˆ, our design of the choice lists ensures that, for most
of the subjects, the vast majority of lottery choices under consideration should be
affected by self-control depletion.
Although the “true” cutoff zˆ is unobservable, one can argue that our choice
lists likely fulfill the payoff requirementsmentioned above evenwithout taking the
proxies provided by the vignettes into account. Strictly speaking, zˆ varies between
subjects, between lotteries, and between conditions, as well as over time, because
all these factorsmight affect themarginal costs of self-control. However, as long as,
for example, €3< zˆ < €22 for Choice List A, the list covers the payoff range that en-
ables a test of thepredictionof theFudenberg–Levinemodel that lower self-control
leads to greater risk aversion. The upper bound of €22 seems very reasonable given
that themedian daily disposable income, net of rent, in our sample is only €10 (sur-
veyed through the post-experiment questionnaire). Regarding the lower bound,
we argue that the value of zˆ must be above the minimum payoff of our lotteries
(€3) for the majority of subjects. If this was not the case, subjects would have to
exhibit risk neutrality according to the Fudenberg–Levine model. Contrary to this,
most of our subjects turn out to be risk-averse, as we report in the Results section.
These arguments jointly suggest that the payoff ranges were appropriate for our
purposes.
3.4. Manipulation checks
Most studies using egodepletiondonot include independentmanipulation checks
but simply rely on the effectiveness of the implemented depletion task based on
the results of previous studies. By contrast, we include a multifaceted manipula-
tion check comprised of several parts in our experiment to be able to assess inde-
pendently from possible treatment effects whether the depletion task did indeed
induce variations in self-control. Ideally, one would assess subjects’ state of self-
control at the same time as measuring their risk attitudes. This is, of course, not
feasible. One possibility would be to introduce all measures of the manipulation
check in between the depletion task and the measurement of risk attitudes. Most
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Fig. 2. Screenshot of the computerized Stroop test.
Notes: The screenshot depicts an incongruent trial, i.e., the meaning of the color word “rot” (“red”)
does not correspond to the color of the word (in this case, shown in blue on the screen). Subjects
would have to press the “Blau” (“Blue”) button.
candidates for manipulation checks (e.g., the Stroop test) are, however, likely to
alter subjects’ level of self-control themselves. We therefore include a short ad hoc
measure thatwedonot consider depleting right after thedepletion task andamore
comprehensive, but possibly depleting part of the manipulation check right after
measuring risk attitudes. Because self-control resources are generally thought to
replenish over time, doing parts of the manipulation check only after the main
part of the experimentmayhave thedisadvantage that self-control resources could
have already replenished partly or completely.
Our first short ad hocmeasure consists of choosing the difficulty of a puzzle (on
a scale fromone to ten). Our conjecture was that depleted subjects would select an
easier puzzle. Since the puzzle is solved only later, the mere choice of its difficulty
level should not affect subjects’ level of self-control resources.
The second part of the manipulation check, performed after risk attitudes
have been measured, is a computerized version of the Stroop test (Stroop, 1935;
MacLeod, 1991). The Stroop test is well-established both as a depletion task and
as a dependent variable in depletion studies (see Hagger et al., 2010). In our com-
puterized version, the name of a color appears in bold letters at the center of the
screen. The letters themselves are also printed in color. In “congruent trials”, this
color corresponds to the word’s meaning, while it differs from the word’s meaning
in “incongruent trials”. Subjects’ task is to indicate the color inwhich the letters are
printed—and not the meaning of the color word. To this end, the screen shows six
buttons that are labeled with color names and located on a circle around the bold
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color word. For a screenshot, see Fig. 2. Subjects have to click the button corre-
sponding to the color in which the word is printed as fast as they can. Just as in the
depletion task, in incongruent trials of the Stroop test, subjects have to exert self-
control to suppress an automatic impulse, namely clicking the button correspond-
ing to the meaning of the word. Immediately after each button click, a new word
appears. Subjects receive no feedback. In our experiment, subjects work on this
task for three minutes. Widely used measures to check for depletion effects are av-
erage response times per trial and the number of correct answers.We expect longer
response times and a lower number of correct answers in the depletion compared
to the control group.
As a third measure that is employed frequently (see Hagger et al., 2010), we
asked subjects at the beginning of the final questionnaire how much they had to
concentrate in each part of the depletion task and how exhausted they felt before
the experiment and at the present moment. For both we calculate differences and
compare them between treatment and control group.
Based on these five independent components of the overall manipulation
check (choice of difficulty of a puzzle, response times and number of correct re-
sponses in the Stroop test, difference in self-reported need to concentrate during
the two parts of the depletion task, and difference in self-reported fatigue at the be-
ginning and end of the experiment) that all have their distinct strengths and weak-
nesses, we construct a joint index of depletion. We z-standardize each of the five
measures, average over them, and again z-standardize the result. Averaging over
different measures of the same construct is a common procedure to reduce mea-
surement error. Thus, we believe that the aggregate depletion index is suited best
to indicate the effectiveness of the depletion task.
3.5. Procedural details and implementation
The detailed sequence of events in each session was as follows:
(i) Instructions. Upon entering the lab, subjects drew a card containing
a number and were asked to sit in the respective booth. They read the in-
structions, were encouraged to ask questions in private, and answered sev-
eral control questions on the computer. (A translation of the instructions
to English can be found in Online Appendix B.)
(ii) Depletion task. Subjects participated in the treatment-specific version of
the crossing-out letters task that either induced low self-control or left self-
control unchanged.
(iii) Part 1 of the manipulation check. Subjects chose the difficulty of a puzzle
(on a scale from 1 to 10) that they solved at the end of the experiment.
(iv) Measurement of risk attitudes. Subjects made lottery decisions in the four
choice lists.
(v) Part 2 of the manipulation check. Stroop test.
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(vi) Puzzle. Subjects solved the puzzle with the chosen level of difficulty.
(vii) Postexperiment questionnaire, including Part 3 of the manipulation check
(self-reported required concentration during each part of the depletion
task and self-reported exhaustion before and after the experiment).
The experiment was conducted at the BonnEconLab, using the software z-Tree
(Fischbacher, 2007). We used ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) for inviting subjects and for
recording their participation. The experiment consisted of thirteen sessions in July
and October 2014. Treatment and control were balanced with respect to day of the
week and time of the day, since there is empirical work that suggests that both self-
control and measured risk attitudes may exhibit a correlation with time of the day
(Kouchaki and Smith, 2014).
All written instructions and all recorded data (except, of course, personal data
such as information on subjects’ bank accounts) as well as the source code used
for running the experiment and used in the data analysis are available as supple-
mentary material on the journal website.
308 subjects participated, each in only one group (152 in the depletion and 156
in the control group). 150 subjects weremale (74 in the depletion and 76 in the con-
trol group), 158 were female (78 in the depletion and 80 in the control group). Most
subjects (92%) were students andmajored in various subjects. Age varied between
17 and 55 years10 (median age, 24 years; 93% in the range 19–30 years) and did not
differ significantly between groups.Noparticular exclusion criteria applied, except
for color blindness.
In total, the experiment lasted about 75 minutes (including payment). Sub-
jects received on average €12.25 from the outcome of one randomly drawn lottery
decision (random lottery incentive mechanism; RLIM) plus an additional €1 for
filling out the questionnaire. Given that we are testing theories that deviate from
expected-utility theory, a comment regarding incentive compatibility of the pay-
ment mechanism is in order. Our instructions tell subjects that it is in their best
interest to treat each choice as if it were the only one because only one lottery de-
cision will be randomly selected for payment. Nevertheless, in case subjects do
not “isolate” decisions but integrate them at least partially into a compound lot-
tery, experiments with only one choice may yield different results than experi-
ments with repeated decisions. This can even occur when the RLIM is used, un-
less subjects obey “statewise monotonicity” (Azrieli et al., 2017), a condition equiv-
alent to “compound independence” (Segal, 1990). In fact, the Fudenberg–Levine
model can predict that different choices are made in a setup with a single choice
than in a setupwithmultiple choices and remuneration via the RLIM. Importantly,
however, we show in Section A.4 in Appendix A that the qualitative prediction re-
garding the treatment effect is unaffected. Hence, judged by the dual-self model,
10 Underage subjects must provide written consent by their parents in order to participate in ex-
periments at the BonnEconLab.
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the RLIM is appropriate for detecting treatment differences resulting from reduced
self-control.
Payments were made in a separate room to ensure privacy. Those subjects for
whomthedelayed lotterywasdrawndidnot receive the lottery’s payoffuntil aweek
later. They could choose between a dated bank transfer and collecting the amount
in cash in person.
The postexperiment questionnaire measured socioeconomic and demo-
graphic characteristics (age, gender, high school GPA, latest math grade at school,
student status and field of study, experience with experiments) and assessed sub-
jects’ general attitudes toward risk and time, using questions from the SOEP ques-
tionnaire (GermanSocio-EconomicPanel). Additionally, via tenquestions adopted
from Hauge et al. (2014), we aimed at measuring whether subjects primarily used
the deliberative or the affective systemwhilemaking their lottery choices. Subjects
also answered a questionnaire on character trait self-control (Tangney et al., 2004;
Bertrams andDickhäuser, 2009) aswell as a questionnaire on positive and negative
affect at the present moment (Watson and Clark, 1999).
4. Results
4.1. Manipulation checks
A manipulation check based on the aggregate depletion index indicates that sub-
jects in the treatment group were significantly more depleted than their counter-
parts in the control group (two-sided t-test, p < 0.001). Translating the aggregate
depletion index into a standardized effect size, we find Cohen’s d = 0.74. More-
over, for each of the five separate parts that comprise the depletion index (see Sec-
tion 3.4), we observe differences between depleted and nondepleted subjects in
the expected direction. That is, subjects in the depletion treatment chose slightly
lower levels of difficulty of a puzzle (two-sidedWilcoxon rank-sum test, p = 0.391),
had slightly longer response times and a slightly lower number of correct answers
in the Stroop test (two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test: p = 0.286 and p = 0.222, re-
spectively), a stronger increase in concentration required for the second part of
the depletion task (two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p < 0.001), and a stronger
increase in exhaustion compared to their control-group counterparts (two-sided
Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p = 0.176).
4.2. Descriptive statistics
Recall that the switching row in each of the four choice lists measures an individ-
ual’s risk attitude.More precisely, differences in expected values of the less risky lot-
tery and its mean-preserving spread at the switching row measure an individual’s
“risk premium”m∼ that has to be added to the riskier lottery to make that subject
indifferent between the two lotteries. Based on these indifference-generating risk
premia, we classify subjects’ behavior into four categories: risk-seeking (negative
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Table 2
Pairwise Pearson’s correlation coefficients of the individual indifference-generating risk premia in
the four choice lists.
mA∼ mB∼ mC∼ mD∼
mA∼ 1
mB∼ 0.3830 1
mC∼ 0.3819 0.2654 1
mD∼ 0.4173 0.5660 0.3481 1
Note. For all correlations shown above: p < 0.0001.
risk premium), risk-neutral (risk premium of zero), risk-averse (positive risk pre-
mium), and dominated choices.
For Choice Lists A, B, and D, 80% to 89% of subjects made risk-averse choices.
This is in line with the widely observed empirical result that a vast majority of in-
dividuals is risk-averse (e.g., Harrison et al., 2007; Dohmen et al., 2011).
For Choice List C, where one of the alternatives is a long shot, i.e., offers a low
probability of winning a large prize, only 46% of subjects are classified as risk-
averse. This shift in expressed risk attitudes due to the presence of a long shot is
expected, based on the commonly observed fourfold pattern of risk attitudes (Har-
baugh et al., 2010)which is usually attributed to an overweighting of the small prob-
ability associated with the large payoff.
A more detailed description of how the risk premium is calculated and how
the categories are formed as well as a table displaying the absolute and relative
frequencies of choices in the four choice lists can be found in Online Appendix A.
It is noteworthy that the size of the indifference-generating risk premia reacts
to differences between the choice lists in a plausiblemanner: On average, subjects
exhibit the highest risk premium (mA∼ = €2.69) for Choice List A (risky vs. risky lot-
tery), i.e., the choice list with the largest difference between the spreads of the two
lotteries. For the long shot, the average risk premium is mC∼ =−€0.36, indicating
that on average subjects behave in a slightly risk-seeking manner.
The risk premia measured in the different choice lists exhibit significant and
positivepairwise correlation coefficients (seeTable 2).Hence,weare confident that
ourmeasures of risk attitudes pick up systematic variation inunderlying individual
risk attitudes.
4.3. Treatment effects
Fig. 3 displays subjects’ choices in detail and serves as a graphical representation of
ourmain results. The variable on the horizontal axis is the indifference-generating
“risk premium”m∼, i.e., the difference in expected values between the lotteries in
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the switching row in euros. Thus, subjects to the right of zero are classified as risk-
averse, while those to the left are classified as risk-seeking.
Result 1. (Hypotheses 1, 2 and 1 b, 2 b.)Egodepletiondoes not increase risk aversion.
We do not observe an increase in risk aversion of the treatment relative to the
control group for any of the choice lists. For Choice Lists A and B, Wilcoxon rank-
sum tests do not reject the null hypothesis of no treatment difference in risk pre-
mia (two-sided p = 0.245 and p = 0.253, respectively). For both choice lists, de-
pleted subjects even show a nonsignificant tendency toward less risk aversion,
withdepleted subjects exhibiting lower indifference-generating riskpremia inboth
Choice List A (∆mA∼ = €0.30; Cohen’s d = 0.13) and Choice List B (∆mB∼ = €0.10; Co-
hen’s d = 0.07).
Result 2. (Hypotheses 3 and 3 b.)When payoffs are delayed, ego depletion does not
affect risk attitudes.
Also in Choice List D, where all payoffs are delayed by one week, depleted sub-
jects are slightly less risk-averse than subjects in the control group (∆mD∼ = €0.22;
Cohen’s d = 0.15). Using two one-sided mean equivalence tests, we reject the null
hypothesis of a difference of half a standard deviation or more (p = 0.001). This is
in line with our initial hypothesis. However, this result would only be evidence in
support of the Fudenberg–Levine model, had Hypotheses 1 and 2 been confirmed
by the data.
Result 3. (Hypothesis 4.) For long shots, there is no evidence for a difference in risk
attitudes under ego depletion.
For Choice List C, where one of the lotteries yields an outcome of €50 with
10% probability, we hypothesized (based on Loewenstein and O’Donoghue, 2005,
p. 28) that ego depletion induces less risk-averse choices through an increased
overweighting of the small probability associated with the large payoff. On aver-
age, subjects are mildly risk-seeking in both the treatment and control group for
Choice List C. We again find that depleted subjects made slightly less risk-averse
choices; however, the difference between the two groups is not statistically signifi-
cant (∆mC∼ = €0.28, Cohen’s d = 0.13, Wilcoxon rank-sum test, two-sided p = 0.335).
Thus, for the sample as a whole, we find no evidence in support of the prediction
by Loewenstein and O’Donoghue.
Result 4. (Hypothesis 4 b.) For long shots, there is no evidence for greater variance
of risk attitudes under ego depletion.
When testing for adifference in variancesbetween treatment andcontrol group
for Choice List C, we find no evidence in favor of this hypothesis (Levene’s robust
test statistic,W0, for the equality of variances, p = 0.999). Neither is there an indi-
cation for a difference in variances for any of the other choice lists (Levene’sW0;
p = 0.310 for Choice List A, p = 0.756 for B, and p = 0.069 for D).
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Fig. 3. Treatment comparison of indifference-generating risk premia.
Notes. The horizontal axis displays the indifference-generating risk premiam∼, i.e., the difference in
the expected values of themore risky and the less risky lottery at the switching row (in euros). Left col-
umn: Histograms of observed risk premia. Right column: Estimated kernel densities (Epanechnikov
kernel functions, optimal-bandwidth routine by Stata).
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4.4. Disaggregating the data: results from linear regressions
Even though we obtain an overall null result regarding the effect of ego depletion
on risk attitudes, it is possible that there is heterogeneity in the effect of ego deple-
tion depending on subject characteristics. Thus, we investigate whether choices
and the effect of ego depletion in our experiment vary with observable character-
istics. We do so by regressing choices on those observables which are most likely
to determine risk attitudes. The results are presented in Table 3. In addition, the
table contains (in its top part) the coefficients of a simple linear regression of risk
attitude on the treatment dummy for convenient comparison.
In the specification with controls, we include gender as an explanatory vari-
able because women are typically found to be more risk-averse than men (see
Croson and Gneezy, 2009, for a general survey on gender differences in risk tak-
ing). Furthermore, we regress our measure of risk attitudes on the final grade at
high school (self-reported by subjects; reverse scoring compared to the American
GPA, i.e., higher grades areworse) as a proxy for IQ, since cognitive ability has been
found to covary with risk attitudes (Dohmen et al., 2010).11 Since there may be in-
dividual differences in both subjects’ baseline self-control ability and in the treat-
ment effect on self-control, we include trait self-control (questionnaire measure;
Tangney et al., 2004) and the standardized aggregate score of the depletion index
in the regression.
Columns 1 through 4 display the regression of choices in each choice list sep-
arately, while column 5 uses the data from all choice lists. The dependent variable
is the indifference-generating risk premiumm∼ for the respective choice list indi-
cated in the column header. Note that the larger m∼, the greater is risk aversion.
The unit of this measure is €.
In line with the literature, baseline risk aversion is higher for women than for
men across all choice lists but only significantly so in Choice List A (p = 0.010). The
coefficients of the IQ proxy and of trait self-control turn out not to be significant,
neither for individual choice lists nor for all choice lists jointly. Moreover, we find
no evidence that risk attitudes vary by the extent of depletion. The coefficient of
the aggregate depletion index is never significantly different from zero. Only for
Choice List A, it is marginally significant (p = 0.075).
Including the interaction of Female and Ego depletion allows us to split up
the effect of ego depletion by gender. The coefficient on the regressor Ego deple-
tion represents the influence of self-control depletion onmen, and the sum of this
coefficient and that on the interaction term (i.e., Ego depletion+Ego depletion×
Female) represents the effect of depletion on women.
11 Despite evidence that age is a determinant of risk attitudes, we do not include it due to limited
variation in age in our sample. For our sample, we find that the coefficient on age is heavily influ-
enced by two outliers (above 50 years). Similarly, we do not control for student status because 92%
of our sample are students. When usingmath grade instead of high school GPA as a proxy for IQ, the
coefficients and their significance levels are virtually unchanged.
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Table 3
Linear regressions of the measure of risk aversion on individual characteristics.
Dependent variable: indifference-generating risk premiumm∼ [in €]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Model 1: Simple regression Choice
List A
Choice
List B
Choice
List C
Choice
List D
Com-
bined
Ego depletion −0.301 −0.100 −0.284 −0.224 −0.233
(0.271) (0.166) (0.265) (0.177) (0.161)
Constant 2.842*** 1.542*** −0.221 2.317*** 1.636***
(0.183) (0.117) (0.182) (0.114) (0.114)
Observations 303 289 295 304 1191
R2 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.005 0.003
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Model 2: Including controls Choice
List A
Choice
List B
Choice
List C
Choice
List D
Com-
bined
Ego depletion −0.563 −0.299 −0.839** −0.425* −0.540***
(0.362) (0.216) (0.379) (0.241) (0.208)
Manipulation check 0.251* 0.111 0.153 −0.036 0.128
(0.141) (0.094) (0.134) (0.104) (0.086)
Female 0.900*** 0.041 0.166 0.313 0.362*
(0.347) (0.228) (0.368) (0.222) (0.216)
Female×Ego depletion 0.173 0.247 0.891* 0.453 0.440
(0.511) (0.326) (0.533) (0.341) (0.306)
Final grade at high school −0.176 −0.019 0.034 0.128 0.002
(GPA equivalent, inversely coded) (0.200) (0.149) (0.228) (0.147) (0.135)
Trait self-control −0.017 0.001 −0.017 0.000 −0.008
(0.016) (0.010) (0.015) (0.010) (0.009)
Constant 2.467*** 1.559*** −0.253 2.142*** 1.493***
(0.247) (0.150) (0.263) (0.163) (0.152)
Observations 303 289 295 304 1191
R2 0.066 0.013 0.042 0.043 0.026
Effect of self-control depletion on women
Ego depletion +
Female×Ego depletion
−0.390 −0.052 0.051 0.028 −0.101
F [Ego depletion+ 0.940 0.033 0.017 0.011 0.156
Female×Ego depletion= 0] (p = 0.33) (p = 0.86) (p = 0.90) (p = 0.92) (p = 0.69)
Notes. Dependent variable: indifference-generating risk premium m∼ for the choice list indicated
in the column header. The larger m∼, the greater risk aversion. Robust standard errors (cluster-
corrected at the subject level for columns 5 and 10) in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance
levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Missing observations (N < 308) are due to exclusion of trials
in which subjects chose a dominated option. The regressors Depletion Check, Final grade at high
school and Trait self-control are mean-centered (so that the constant represents the indifference-
generating risk premium at the sample mean of these variables). Also note that in the German grad-
ing system, 1 is the best grade, and 4 is the worst among the passing grades.
In all choice lists, men tend to become less risk-averse under depletion, for
Choice Lists C and D even (marginally) significantly so (p = 0.028, and p = 0.079,
respectively). Aggregating over all choice lists, the average man is indifferent at
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a 54 cent lower risk premium in the depletion than in the control group (p = 0.010),
which goes against our hypotheses.12 Interestingly, self-control depletion has ba-
sically no effect on women, as can be seen from the bottom three rows of Table 3.
This finding is in line with Friehe and Schildberg-Hörisch (2017).
Recall that in Choice List C, one of the lotteries is a “long shot”, i.e., it features
a small probability of winning a large prize. Here, the tendency that depleted men
are on average indifferent at a 84 cents lower risk premium than nondepletedmen
(p = 0.028) conforms with Hypothesis 4. This could be interpreted as evidence in
favor of increased overweighting of the small probability associated with the large
payoff, as Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2005) predict for reduced self-control.
However, we find a decrease in risk aversion, albeit less pronounced and mostly
nonsignificant, also across the remaining choice lists—for which their model does
not predict an influence of self-control depletion.Moreover, the effect is absent for
women. Hence, in sum, there is only limited evidence for the channel proposed by
Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2005).
4.5. Summary
Although our manipulation check suggests that the manipulation effectively de-
pleted the self-control resources of subjects in the treatment group, we do not find
any significant difference in risk attitudes between subjects in the treatment and
control group. However, we observe the same nonsignificant tendency for all four
choice lists. Under depletion, subjects behave in a slightly less risk-averse manner,
in contrast to the prediction of the Fudenberg–Levine model.
5. Discussion and conclusion
Our goal in this paper is to investigate the causal influence of self-control on risk
attitudes. Self-control, a concept from psychology, has been conceptualized and
formalized in economics through dual-self models (in particular, Fudenberg and
Levine, 2006, 2011, 2012) and dual-system models (in particular, Loewenstein and
O’Donoghue, 2005; Mukherjee, 2010). These models posit that a central determi-
nant of risk attitudes is an individual’s current level of self-control.
Building on the Fudenberg–Levine dual-self model, we derive hypotheses for
choices between risky monetary payoffs in a state of low self-control, compared
to regular self-control. We show that the model predicts that lower levels of self-
control induce stronger risk aversion for stakes within a particular range. We then
test the hypotheses in a lab experiment with a large number of subjects by exoge-
nously lowering self-control resources in half of our subjects via so-called ego de-
pletion. We do not find any evidence for increased risk aversion after self-control
12 The regression analysis adds significance tests for several coefficients. Given the large share of
nonsignificant results, the significant effect of ego depletion onmen’s risk aversion should be judged
with due care.
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depletion. Contrary to the theoretical predictions of the Fudenberg–Levinemodel,
our results document a consistent but nonsignificant tendency of depleted sub-
jects to become less risk-averse. Only formale subjects, this tendency is significant
when considering their decisions across all four choice lists jointly.
Before discussing the implications of our findings for themodeling of decision
making under risk, we exclude several alternative explanations of our data.
A possible concern might be that some of the payoffs of our choice lists were
not chosenoptimally, i.e., the respective choices didnot reflect the case inwhich, at
least in one of the two lotteries, one payoff was below and another above the theo-
retical cutoff zˆ. In these cases, themodel of Fudenberg et al. (2014) does not predict
any effect of ego depletion on risk attitudes. Using the values that we measured in
the vignettes as proxies for zˆ suggests that this might be the case for about 33% of
the total number of choices (85 per subject), while our payoff choices imply that
ego depletion should affect risk attitudes in the remaining 67% of choices.13 We
find that our results are robust to excluding those choices for which we predict no
effect of ego depletion on risk attitudes based on the individual zˆ. In particular, we
still do not find any significant difference in risk attitudes between treatment and
control group for any of the choice lists (Wilcoxon rank-sum tests, p = 0.487 for
Choice List A, p = 0.915 for Choice List B, p = 0.346 for Choice List C, and p = 0.435
for Choice List D).14
Another possible concern may be that all subjects were depleted to begin with
and thus could not have been affected by the treatment difference. We do not find
evidence in support of that view. 65% of subjects report an initial exhaustion level
of 5 or less on a Likert scale ranging from 0 to 10. Moreover, when we restrict our
analysis to those subjects who report initial exhaustion below themedian level of 3,
there is no significant increase in risk aversion either (t-tests, p = 0.244 for Choice
List A, p = 0.912 for B, p = 0.089 for C, and p = 0.362 for D, with subjects in the de-
pletion condition being even less risk-averse for Choice Lists B through D).
A further hypothesis is that self-control depletion has a different effect on risk
attitudes than is suggested by the Fudenberg–Levine model. Rather than causing
a shift in the distribution of risk preferences, it may make subjects more likely to
makemistakes, leading to ahigher variance indecisions under depletion. Basedon
the tests reported in Section 4.3, we do not find evidence in favor of this hypothesis.
Alternatively, self-control as a stable character traitmight explainheterogeneity
in risk attitudes across individuals, even if temporary changes in self-control as
induced by depletion tasks do not have a significant impact on risk preferences. In
this vein, Fudenberg and Levine (2011, p. 57) state, “One possible next step would
be to try tomore explicitly account for the evident heterogeneity of the population,
and estimate distributions of self-control parameters . . . .” We therefore measure
trait self-control in the questionnaire, using the German version of the scale by
13 We assign each subject the average zˆ from her answers to both vignettes.
14 Subjects are included if at their individual switching row, the condition that for at least one of
the two lotteries one payoff is below and the other is above their individual average zˆ is fulfilled.
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Tangney et al. (2004). While trait self-control is, for example, a significant predictor
of the final grade at high school in our data, it does not explain risk attitudes in any
of our choice lists.
Moreover, decision making between groups might differ in systematic ways
which do not manifest themselves in choices. For example, subjects may rely on
heuristics to a larger extent in the depletion than in the control group (e.g., Loewen-
stein and O’Donoghue, 2005). It is likely that decision times using heuristics are
shorter (Rubinstein, 2007, 2016). According to this measure, we do not find any ev-
idence for increased reliance on heuristics by depleted subjects. In fact, decision
times of subjects in the depletion group are slightly longer for all choice lists, al-
beit insignificantly so (t-tests; 87 s vs. 81 s, p = 0.149 for Choice List A; 49 s vs. 46 s,
p = 0.219 for B; 72 s vs. 68 s, p = 0.474 for C; 81 s vs. 77 s, p = 0.275 for D; and 72 s vs.
68 s, p = 0.192, cluster-corrected, for all choice lists jointly).
Beingnull results, ourfindings add to the recent skepticismagainst all “strength
of self-control”-type of models, including Fudenberg and Levine’s. Most promi-
nently, Carter and McCullough (2014) reanalyze the data of the meta-analysis of
Hagger et al. (2010). They find indications of small-sample effects, in particular
publication bias. When correcting for publication bias, estimated effect sizes are
smaller, between 0.42 and 0, depending on which statistical method is used. In
reaction to Carter and McCullough (2014), Hagger et al. (2016) conducted a large-
scale, preregistered replication study that failed to reproduce an effect of a cross-
ing-out letters task on a subsequent self-control task. Our crossing-out letters task,
however, differs from the one in their study in that it is neither computerized nor
does it leave out the stage of establishing the impulse to cross out the letter “e”.
These are exactly the aspects that Baumeister and Vohs (2016a) regard as the main
reasons for manipulation failure in Hagger et al. (2016). Thus, our setup gives self-
control failure due to ego depletion the best possible chance to produce an effect.
Nevertheless, one could argue that the effect of ego depletion might not be
strong enough to induce an increase in self-control costs. However, using an ego
depletion task is a way to operationalize self-control that Fudenberg et al. (2014)
themselves suggest in order tomake their model testable. Moreover, our aggregate
manipulation check implies that subjects in the treatment group were indeed sig-
nificantly more depleted than those in the control group.
Furthermore, our sample size of N = 308 exceeds the sample size of all except
one of the 198 studies on the effects of ego depletion that are covered by the meta-
analyses by Hagger et al. (2010) and Carter and McCullough (2014) (only 10 of the
198 studies have a sample size that exceeds 100), and power analyses show that it
yields sufficient power to document relevant effect sizes.
Still, we do not find any evidence for increased risk aversion after ego depletion
as predicted by the model of Fudenberg et al. (2014) with convex self-control costs.
On average, depleted subjects even tend to be less risk-averse, albeit not signifi-
cantly so. As we argue in Section 4.4, for men there is some but limited evidence
that this decrease in risk aversion is generated by increased probability weighting,
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as Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2005) predict. Our findings that men are signif-
icantly less risk-averse when considering all choice lists are also in line with those
by Friehe and Schildberg-Hörisch (2017).
Traditionally, economics has modeled decision makers without any reference
to psychological concepts like “self-control”. Due to the inability of the standard
models of economic choice—expected-utility theory and discounted utility—to
explain particular phenomena in intertemporal decision making and decision
making under risk, concepts from psychology have been integrated into newmod-
els to increase their explanatory power.
We have no doubt that economics can benefit from incorporating psychologi-
cal concepts in general and self-control in particular. For instance, we consider it
plausible that self-control plays an important role in savings decisions, addiction,
and health-related behavior such as food choice. However, its influence in deci-
sion making under risk seems limited: in our data different levels of self-control
only carry over to different risk attitudes in a negligible extent. In particular, given
that we observe a nonsignificant tendency toward decreased rather than increased
risk aversion following ego depletion, our findings cast doubt on the “unified expla-
nation” offered by Fudenberg and Levine (2006): risk attitudes and intertemporal
choice seem to be less interrelated—or related in different ways—than theirmodel
suggests.
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Appendix A. Derivation of hypotheses from the Fuden-
berg–Levine model
We briefly sketched the Fudenberg–Levine model in Section 2.1. In the following, we de-
scribe the interaction between the long-run and the short-run self in greater detail. In par-
ticular, we examine pairwise choice between two-outcome lotteries in the approximate
model developed by Fudenberg et al. (2014). Finally, we explicitly incorporate self-control
depletion in the model so that we can derive hypotheses concerning its effect on choices
between two-outcome lotteries.
A.1. The model in detail
A.1.1. Mental accounting
Just like in Fudenberg and Levine (2006, 2011), agents in the approximate model (Fuden-
berg et al., 2014) use mental accounting—the mental assignment of expenditures to differ-
ent accounts—as a means to avoid costly self-control.15 An agent in this model lives for
several periods. Each of these periods can be thought of as being mentally divided into
two subperiods, a “banking period” for planning and a “night-club period” for spending
money. During the banking subperiod, there is no possibility for consumption. Instead,
the long-run self plans howmuch “pocket cash” x to take to the night club and howmuch
to save for future periods. In other words, it chooses an expenditure level for the second
subperiod. During the night-club subperiod, the short-run self spends all “pocket cash”,
and no self-control costs arise.
There can be unanticipated income (“windfall profits”) during the night-club period.
This income can be stochastic, and it can present itself in the form of multiple income
opportunities betweenwhich the agent can choose, such that the realized incomedepends
on the agent’s choice (e.g., accepting or declining the offer to substitute for a coworkerwho
has called in sick on short notice). Following the notation in Fudenberg et al. (2014), let
consumption c refer to consumption on top of the planned consumption level x. In such
a situation, once planned consumption x has been determined, the short-run self’s choice
between unanticipated income opportunities depends on c only. Hence, we suppress x in
our notation and can denote the short-run self’s consumption utility as a function u(c).
It is assumed that u′(c)> 0 and u′′(c)< 0. Note that, unlike “standard” consumption levels,
c can be negative, as long as c >−x.
A.1.2. Lotteries
In this setup, unexpectedly facing a set ℑ of income opportunities is a situation in
which self-control becomes relevant. Lotteries are denoted as discrete random variables
Z ∈ℑ that can take on values z1, . . .,zn , the lotteries’ outcomes. Since the short-run self
only cares about immediate consumption, its preferred plan of action is to spend all
lottery gains immediately and, thus, to choose the lottery with the highest expected
short-run utility Eu(Z ). The utility derived from this is called “temptation” and denoted
u?(ℑ)≡maxZ∈ℑEu(Z ).16 The long-run self, in contrast, prefers to smooth consumption
15 What is referred to as mental accounting here is only one component of mental accounting as
described in Thaler and Shefrin (1981).
16 For notational convenience, we suppress the dependence of temptation u? on the menu ℑ in
the following.
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over time. Its value function is therefore close to risk-neutral. Through use of self-control
it enforces an action that balances the short-run self’s want for immediate consumption
and its own preference for consumption smoothing.
A.1.3. Self-control
This act of self-control is assumed to be costly, with the cost depending on the temptation
u? as well as the actual consumption plan c˜ that the long-run self enforces. This cost en-
ters the overall objective function through a self-control cost function g [u?−Eu(c˜)]. The
function g [·] is assumed to be smooth, nondecreasing, and weakly convex.17 Its argument,
u?−Eu(c˜), can be interpreted as foregone utility: (expected) utility that the short-run self
was not allowed to realize due to being restricted by the long-run self. If Eu(c˜)= u?, no
self-control is exerted and, consequently, no costs arise, g [0]= 0. Whenever the long-run
self enforces an (expected) level of utility that is lower than the one desired by the short-
run self, i.e., whenever Eu(c˜)< u?, self-control costs are nonnegative: g [u?−Eu(c˜)]≥ 0. It
is important to note that this makes preferences over lotteries menu-dependent, because
these preferences depend on self-control costs which depend on temptation u? which, in
turn, depends on the menu of lotteries ℑ.
A.2. Optimization
We will now consider preferences over menus of unanticipated lotteries, which match the
situation in the lab. We address the decision problem that an agent faces when picking
a lottery Z frommenu ℑ in two steps. We first calculate optimal consumption for an arbi-
trary lottery. Then we derive how lotteries are ranked for two-outcome lotteries—the case
that we employ in our experiment.
A.2.1. Optimal consumption plan in the presence of self-control costs
For each lottery in the menu ℑ, the agent chooses a contingent consumption plan c˜ with
outcomes (c1, . . . ,cn), where ci is consumption in case the lottery outcome zi realizes
(i = 1, . . . ,n). Note that choosing the optimal consumption plan is equivalent to choos-
ing an optimal level of self-control for each of the n lottery outcomes. It is determined by
equating the marginal cost from exerting self-control and the marginal gain from saving
for future periods.
The first-period utility for each lottery is Eu(c˜)− g [u?−Eu(c˜)]. Representing all future
utility using a value function v , the discounted present value of all future consumption is
δEv(w2+Z − c˜). Here,w2 denotes total wealth at the beginning of the next period, δ is the
discount factor, and Z − c˜ is the random savings plan implied by consumption plan c˜.
Thus, we get an overall objective function of
V (c˜,u?,Z ,w2) = Eu(c˜)− g [u?−Eu(c˜)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
1st-period utility
+δEv(w2+Z − c˜)︸ ︷︷ ︸
future utitlity
.
17 In order to model potential effects of varying levels of self-control, a convex self-control cost
function is the relevant—and realistic—case to consider (see Fudenberg andLevine, 2006, SectionV).
32
A.2.2. Approximate model
Fudenberg et al. (2014) derive an approximate objective function from this as follows. First,
the authors define a “self-control gain function”
h[Eu(c˜)−u?]≡ Eu(c˜)−u?− g [u?−Eu(c˜)]
which is substituted into the objective function. It captures the effect of exerting self-
control on first-period utility. At Eu(c˜)= u?, no self-control is exerted, and neither a cost
nor a benefit arises. Exerting an additional unit of self-control both increases the cost of
self-control, g [u?−Eu(c˜)], and lowers Eu(c˜)−u?, the expected utility for consumption
plan c˜ compared to succumbing to temptation completely, i.e., receiving u?. The function
h[·] is nonpositive, smooth, strictly increasing, and weakly concave, while its argument is
nonpositive by definition. Furthermore, it holds that h′(0)≥ 1.
Additionally, the authors perform a first-order Taylor approximation of the unknown
value function v . It is by virtue of this approximation that the long-run self in the approxi-
matemodel is completely risk-neutral—instead of only being very close to risk-neutral, as
in the original model.
Note that, since the level of pocket cash was chosen optimally in the absence of self-
control problems, we know that at c = 0 (no incremental consumption), it must hold that
u′(0)= δv ′(w2). This is a useful observation since the unknown expression δv ′(w2) can be
replaced by u′(0).
These two steps lead to the following approximate objective function:
max
c˜
U c (c˜,u?,Z ) = max
c˜
{h[Eu(c˜)−u?]+u′(0)(EZ −Ec˜)}.
This optimization problem over c˜ is constrained by ci ≤ zi for i = 1,2, . . . ,n.
Fudenberg et al. (2014)’s main theorem (p. 57) states that this optimization problem
over the optimal consumption plan (a vector of dimension n) is equal to an optimization
problemwhere the choice variable is a single threshold, denoted z. All lottery earnings are
spent in full for realizations below z, while above z, self-control is exerted, and all earnings
beyond z are saved:
maxzU (u?,Z ,z), where (A.1)
U (u?,Z ,z) ≡ h[Eu(Z )−u?−Emax{u(Z )−u(z),0}]+u′(0)Emax{Z − z,0}.
The optimal z that solves this problem is denoted
zˆ ≡ argmax
z
U (u?,Z ,z).
Note that this value is specific to each lottery and menu, as it depends on both Z and the
menu-dependent u?. Refer to the main theorem in Fudenberg et al. (2014) for proof.
A.2.3. Ranking two-outcome lotteries
Thefinal step in theagent’s optimizationproblem is choosingbetween lotteries, taking into
account the lottery-specific optimal consumption plans as they were derived above. That
is, the agent ranks lotteries Z according toU (u?,Z , zˆ). While the preceding derivation was
general, the following will be specific to the case that we use in our experiment: pairwise
choice between two-outcome lotteries. Let us denote these lotteries as discrete random
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variables Z A (with possible realizations zA1 and zA2 ) and ZB (with possible realizations zB1
and zB2 ). Assume zA1 ≤ zA2 and zB1 ≤ zB2 , without loss of generality.
In our experiment, we test whether subjects’ choices, i.e., their pairwise lottery rank-
ings, change in response to an increase in self-control costs due to ego depletion. Formally,
such preference reversals come about when the slope of an agent’s indifference curve,
dz2/dz1|U=const (i.e., her willingness to accept a reduction in one payoff of the lottery in
exchange for an increase in the second payoff, holding expected utility constant), changes.
Thus, to derive predictions about how an increase in self-control costs affects agents’ lot-
tery choices, we need to consider the effect of increased self-control costs on the slope of
their indifference curves.
Let us denote by zˆA the optimal cutoff value associated with Lottery Z A and by zˆB the
optimal cutoff value associated with Lottery ZB , given that the menu is ℑ= {Z A ,ZB }. (Re-
member that each cutoff value, and thus the ranking of the lotteries, is menu-dependent
through u? =max{Eu(Z A),Eu(ZB )}.)
The indifference set for a “reference lottery” Z A , I(Z A), is the set of all lotteries ZB
for which the agent is indifferent when given the choice between Z A and ZB , i.e., I(Z A)≡
{ZB |U (u?,Z A , zˆA)=U (u?,ZB , zˆB )}. It is implicitly defined by
U (u?,Z A , zˆA)−U (u?,ZB , zˆB )︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ Φ(Z A ,ZB ,u?,zˆA ,zˆB )
= 0.
Note that Φ(·) is a function of zB1 and zB2 and the associated probabilities p and 1−p,
respectively—as well as Z A , u?, zˆA , and zˆB . To be able to determine the slope of the indif-
ference curve, i.e., dzB2 /dzB1 , we use the implicit function theorem. One of its prerequisites
is continuous differentiability of the function Φ(·) with respect to zB1 and zB2 , at least in
some neighborhood of the point Z A = ZB , which is where we calculate the slope. It can be
shown that at this point, dΦ/du? = 0. In addition, it holds for any Z A ,ZB that dΦ/dzˆA =
dΦ/dzˆB = 0. This is because zˆA and zˆB maximize U (u?,Z A ,zA) and U (u?,ZB ,zB ), re-
spectively. Therefore, we only need to consider the dependence of Φ(·) on zB1 and zB2
through the direct dependence ofU (u?,ZB , zˆB ) on these values, i.e., the partial derivatives
∂U (u?,ZB , zˆB )/∂zBi with i = 1,2.
Via the implicit function theorem, it holds that
dΦ(·)
dzB1
+ dΦ(·)
dzB2
dzB2
dzB1
= 0 (A.2)
⇐⇒ dz
B
2
dzB1
= −dΦ(·)
dzB1
/
dΦ(·)
dzB2
=⇒ dz
B
2
dzB1
= −∂U (u
?,ZB , zˆB )
∂zB1
/
∂U (u?,ZB , zˆB )
∂zB2
. (A.3)
Recall that the probability of payoff zB1 is p and that of zB2 is 1−p. Then
U (u?,ZB , zˆB )
= h[Eu(ZB )−u?−Emax{u(ZB )−u(zˆB ),0}]+u′(0)Emax{ZB − zˆB ,0} (A.4)
= h[p u(zB1 )+ (1−p)u(zB2 )−u?− (A.5)
pmax{u(zB1 )−u(zˆB ),0}− (1−p)max{u(zB2 )−u(zˆB ),0}
]
+u′(0)[pmax{zB1 − zˆB ,0}+ (1−p)max{zB2 − zˆB ,0}].
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For the derivatives with respect to zB1 and zB2 , we get
∂U (u?,ZB , zˆB )
∂zB1
=
{
h′
[
Eu(ZB )−u?− (1−p)max{u(zB2 )−u(zˆB ),0}
]
p u′(zB1 ) if zB1 < zˆB
u′(0)p if zB1 > zˆB
and
∂U (u?,ZB , zˆB )
∂zB2
=
{
h′
[
Eu(ZB )−u?−pmax{u(zB1 )−u(zˆB ),0}
]
(1−p)u′(zB2 ) if zB2 < zˆB
u′(0)(1−p) if zB2 > zˆB
.
A.2.4. Case distinctions
Since the following reasoning applies to arbitrary two-outcome lotteries Z , we now drop
the superscript B . The dependence of utility on the cutoff zˆ implies that when calculating
the slopes of the indifference curves that describe preferences over two-outcome lotteries,
we need to distinguish three cases. The three cases are also illustrated graphically in Fig. A1.
Remember that temptation u? is menu-dependent but identical for both lotteries, while
the threshold zˆ is menu-dependent (through u?) and at the same time lottery-specific.
Hence, whenever it holds that z1 < zˆ < z2 (the 3rd case below) for at least one of the two
lotteries, self-control affects the curvature of the indifference curves and, thus, the agent’s
risk attitudes when she chooses among two lotteries.
1st case: max{z1,z2}≤ zˆ. In this case, the short-run self spends all additional income.
Hence, the slope of the indifference curve is
dz2
dz1
= − h
′[Eu(Z )−u?]p u′(z1)
h′
[
Eu(Z )−u?](1−p)u′(z2) = − p u
′(z1)
(1−p)u′(z2)
. (A.6)
Thus, in the 1st case, the combined preferences of the two selves correspond to those
of the short-run self, i.e., risk aversion. If all lotteries in themenu fall into this category,
they are ranked according to Eu(Z ), expected utility with the short-run self’s degree of
risk aversion.
2nd case: zˆ ≤min{z1,z2}. In this case, the amount that the short-run self is permitted by
the long-run self to spend in addition to its initial allowance is smaller than all of the
lottery outcomes. Thus, the short-run self derives the same utility from all outcomes,
and the agent’s combined preferences over lotteries correspond to those of the long-
run self. Consequently, the slope of the indifference curve is
dz2
dz1
= − p u
′(0)
(1−p)u′(0) = −
p
1−p . (A.7)
Thus, if all lotteries in the menu fall into this category, the agent behaves in a risk-
neutral manner, and lotteries are ranked according to their expected value E(Z ).
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z1
z
z
2
z
Indifference curves for p1 = 0.5
Fig. A1. Illustration of the three cases.
Notes: Displayed are indifference curves over two-outcome lotteries with payoffs z1 and z2, associ-
ated probabilities p1 = p2 = 0.5, and cutoff z. The agent’s indifference curves are linear for z1 > z and
z2 > z, while they are concave elsewhere. For z1 < z and z2 < z, the curvature is strongest. Note that
this graphonly serves to illustrate the rationale of (A.6), (A.7), and (A.8). The optimal cutoff zˆ is lottery-
dependent, and z will thus differ depending on which lottery is considered.
3rd case: z1 < zˆ < z2. In this case, one outcome is below and the other is above the cutoff
zˆ, so that the slope of the indifference curves depends on h′[·],
dz2
dz1
= −h
′[p u(z1)−u?+ (1−p)u(zˆ)]p u′(z1)
(1−p)u′(0) . (A.8)
Only in this 3rd case does the slope of the self-control gain function enter the slope of
the indifference curves.
Consequently, only in the 3rd case does the slope of the indifference curves change
under self-control depletion, such that depletion can lead to changes in lottery choices,
i.e., measured risk attitudes.
A.3. Depletion: model predictions and hypotheses
A.3.1. Incorporating different levels of self-control
Wenowapply themodel’s predictions for two-outcome lotteries to derive specific hypothe-
ses concerning the effects of self-control depletion. We incorporate depletion and the re-
sulting increase in marginal self-control costs into the model by defining different self-
control cost functions gND[·] and gD[·] for the nondepleted and the depleted state, respec-
tively.
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Recall that a greater u?−Eu(c˜) denotes a greater amount of exerted self-control. Also
recall that u?−Eu(c˜)≥ 0, g [u?−Eu(c˜)]≥ 0, and g [0]= 0. We assume that
gND[u?−Eu(c˜)] ≤ gD[u?−Eu(c˜)] for all u?−Eu(c˜).18
The “self-control gain function” was defined as h[Eu(c˜)−u?] ≡ Eu(c˜)−u? −
g [u?−Eu(c˜)]; hence, h[Eu(c˜)−u?]≤ 0 and h[0]= 0. Thus, with hND[Eu(c˜)−u?] ≡
Eu(c˜)−u?− gND[u?−Eu(c˜)] and hD[Eu(c˜)−u?]≡ Eu(c˜)−u?− gD[u?−Eu(c˜)], we have
hND[Eu(c˜)−u?] ≥ hD[Eu(c˜)−u?] for all Eu(c˜)−u?.
The function g [u?−Eu(c˜)]wasassumed tobeweakly convex. Therefore, gND[·]≤ gD[·]
implies gND′[·]≤ gD′[·]. It follows that h[Eu(c˜)−u?] is weakly concave and that
hND
′
[Eu(c˜)−u?] ≤ hD′[Eu(c˜)−u?] for all Eu(c˜)−u?.
Intuitively, an increase in themarginal cost of self-control affects optimal choice by in-
creasing the relative importance of the self-control costs in the current period compared
to the benefit of saving for future periods. In other words, the short-run self’s interest to
consume right now becomes more important. This has two effects. The first is immedi-
ately apparent from (A.8). When plugging in a higher value for h′[·] in (A.8), the slope of
the indifference curve becomes steeper. Thus, the agent’s combined risk attitudes exhibit
more risk aversion. The second effect of an increase inmarginal self-control costs is that zˆ
increases for each lottery. A higher zˆ implies that some lotteries will be evaluated by (A.6)
thatwere formerly evaluatedby (A.8) and some lotterieswill be evaluatedby (A.8) thatwere
formerly evaluated by (A.7). Both effects result in increased risk aversion.
A.3.2. Hypotheses
For one or both of these mechanisms to affect choices, at least one of the two lotteries
needs to be such that (A.8) applies in at least one of the states (depletion or nondepletion).
This leads us to our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Ego depletion leads to greater risk aversion for choices between lotteries if
at least one of the lotteries contains a small payoff below and another larger payoff above
a cutoff value zˆ.
Our second hypothesis refers to the case in which one of the lotteries is a sure payoff:
Hypothesis 2. The effect of ego depletion (i.e., increased risk aversion) is stronger when one
“lottery” is a sure payoff.
If the per-period utility function is concave, a sure payoff leads to higher short-run util-
ity than a lottery with the same expected value. A sure payoff is, thus, more tempting. (See
also Fudenberg and Levine, 2011, pp. 35, 46, 66.) With a more tempting reference lottery,
the function g [u?−Eu(c˜)] is evaluated at a higher level u?−Eu(c˜) than for a less tempting
reference lottery. Consequently, h[Eu(c˜)−u?] and h′[Eu(c˜)−u?] are evaluated for more
negative Eu(c˜)−u?. As h[Eu(c˜)−u?] is weakly concave, the difference in the slopes of the
18 This is conceptually very similar to the way in which Fudenberg and Levine (2006, Section V)
incorporate cognitive load in their original model, by adding an amount d to u?−Eu(c˜).
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indifference curves under depletion and nondepletion will be larger with a riskless refer-
ence lottery thanwith a risky reference lottery. Again, this holds only if for at least oneof the
two lotteries in themenu, one lottery outcome is below and the other is above the cutoff zˆ.
Our third hypothesis serves to differentiate the dual-selfmodel fromothermodels that
potentially make similar predictions as Hypotheses 1 and 2. It does so by outlining a situa-
tion in which changes in self-control should show no effect according to the model, while,
for instance, increased reliance on heuristics would generate an effect.
Hypothesis 3. When payoffs are delayed, ego depletion has no effect.
The intuition for Hypothesis 3 is provided in the main text.
A.4. Choosing between multiple two-outcome lotteries
The derivation above assumes that subjects face a single lottery choice only—or that they
consider each choice among repeated choices in isolation. In our case, this would mean
that subjects conceive of each choice in each row of each choice list as a separate choice,
thusmaking 85 separate choicesbetween two two-outcome lotteries.Wecall suchbehavior
“isolating” (borrowing the terminology of Cubitt et al., 1998).
In our experiment, we used repeated choices in combination with the random lottery
incentive mechanism (RLIM; also called “random problem selection” or “RPS” mecha-
nism) to remunerate subjects. This means that each offered lottery is in fact part of a com-
pound lottery, with the superordinate lottery given by the RLIM. Subjects might thus per-
ceive the two lotteries offered in each row just as that: as the second stages of a compound
lottery. In that case, choice is not repeated pairwise choice between two-outcome lotteries
anymore but instead amounts to selecting one out of the available multioutcome com-
pound lotteries.
To give an example, consider a subject who conceives of determining the switching
row in our Choice List A (which featured 25 rows) as one single choice. In the terminology
of Fudenberg et al. (2014), this subject selects one particular compound lottery Z out of
a choice setℑof 25 compound lotteries.19 Thus, Z is amultioutcome lottery, and the choice
amounts to selecting one out of 25 elements in ℑ. Henceforth, we will call this behavior
“integrating”.
The question arises whether the predictions regarding the treatment effect still hold
when subjects do not isolate choices but integrate them into a compound lottery. As Azrieli
et al. (2017, p. 10) state, it “is well known that the RPS mechanism is incentive compati-
ble when all admissible extensions satisfy the expected utility axioms.” However, since the
Fudenberg–Levinemodel was developed to explain, among other phenomena, deviations
from expected utility, we need to analyze the model’s predictions regarding repeated pair-
wise lottery choice for integrating decision makers.
Essentially, the same logic as outlined in Section A.2.3—where zB1 and zB2 were the
only payoffs in a two-outcome lottery—applies to any pair of payoffs included in a higher-
dimensional compound lottery. A subject who integrates pairwise choices into a com-
pound lottery still has to trade off the involved outcomes. Crucially, an integrating sub-
ject has to do this for each pairwise choice between the two-outcome lotteries that ulti-
mately comprise the high-dimensional compound lotteries. This is due to the structure of
19 The 26th option of always choosing the lottery on the right-hand side of the choice list contains
a dominated compound lottery, so that choosing it is not consistent with the Fudenberg et al. (2014)
model.
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our choice lists, which all feature first-order stochastically dominating alternatives from
row to row. Since the dual-self model respects stochastic dominance (see Fudenberg et al.,
2014, Proposition 4), for our choice lists, the preference order over the compound lotter-
ies is unambiguously determined by the dual-self’s risk attitudes over pairwise choices.
Hence, also an integrating subject has to decide which of the two two-outcome lotteries
s/he prefers in every row—just like an isolating subject.
Therefore, all arguments concerning two-outcome lotteries and binary choices (as iso-
lating subjects would perceive the choice lists) are also valid for a multialternative choice
with multioutcome lotteries (as integrating subjects would view the decision problem).
While this shows that integrating and isolating subjects’ decisions rely on the same ba-
sic logic, it does not imply that they make identical choices. Recall that both temptation
utility u? and the cutoff zˆ are menu-dependent. Hence, an integrating subject potentially
has different values foru? and zˆ than an isolating subject.Nevertheless, theywill be quanti-
tatively similar, as we argue in the following. For an integrating subject, the short-run self’s
temptation utility u? is the highest achievable expected utility of the compound lottery.
This expected utility is given by a weighted sum of the highest achievable expected utility
in each row—i.e., it is a weighted sumof the various temptation utilities of an isolating sub-
ject. Hence, u? and, consequently, zˆ will have similar values independent of whether sub-
jects view a choice list as one decision or as several decisions. Thus, while the predictions
of the model, while not identical, will be quantitatively similar for both types of subjects.
Another difference between integrating and isolating subjects may arise from the fact
that probabilities of the two-outcome lotteries are downweighted by integrating subjects,
because integrators take into account that each row is only chosen with a probability of
1/nint (e.g., nint = 85 for the entire experiment or nint = 25 for Choice List A). For integrat-
ing subjects, the associated probabilities of the outcomes in Eq. (A.5) are (1/nint)p and
(1/nint) (1−p), respectively. As argued above, the rest of the calculus remains the same be-
cause the choice of the compound lottery reduces to pairwise choice per row. The factor
1/nint appears in both the numerator and the denominator in Eqs. (A.6), (A.7), and (A.8),
and thus cancels out. Only in determining where the marginal self-control gain function
h′[·] is evaluated in Eq. (A.8) does it play a role.
Summing up, this means that although isolators and integrators may behave in quan-
titatively different ways, the prediction regarding the qualitative effect of decreased self-
control stays the same. This is because integrating subjects ultimately face a pairwise
choice per row of the choice lists. Hence, while the dual-self model suggests that re-
peated choices under theRLIM lead todifferent expressedpreferences thana single choice,
the predicted treatment effect for our experiment is qualitatively the same, regardless of
whether subjects isolate decisions or integrate them into a compound lottery.
A.5. Operationalization of the model
As afinal aspect, any empirical investigation of the Fudenberg–Levinemodel requiresmak-
ing an assumption about timing that the model is silent about. In the model, the decision
maker’s choice of an option with stochastic outcomes, the realization of the outcome, and
the subsequent consumption decision (determined by the interplay of the short-run and
the long-run self) all happen instantaneously. This entails that self-control when making
the lottery choice and whenmaking the consumption decision are identical.
In reality, the simultaneity of the lottery choice and the consumption decision is un-
avoidably violated: consumption will always occur later than the lottery choice—in an ex-
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periment, subjects usually have to postpone it until after leaving the lab. Hence, the ques-
tion becomes important whether self-control capacity during the lottery choice or during
the consumption decision should be manipulated.
If one advocates that depletion should be applied at the time of the consumption de-
cision, one has to assume that decision makers forecast their self-control capacity for the
consumption decision andmake their lottery choice based on the anticipated self-control
capacity (an assumption which is not part of the original model). In contrast to this, Fu-
denberg and Levine (2011) and Fudenberg et al. (2014) consider self-control at the time of
the lottery choice the relevant factor. Fudenberg and Levine (2011, pp. 65/66) refer to exper-
imental evidence by Benjamin et al. (2013) regarding the influence of concurrent cognitive
load on lottery choices, and Fudenberg et al. (2014, p. 66) explicitly advocate the use of ego
depletion and/or cognitive load to test their theory: “This means that the theory implies
that reversals . . . can be induced by increasing cognitive load”. Please note that cognitive
load is an even more short-term manipulation than ego depletion (see Baumeister and
Vohs, 2016b, pp. 70/71). A possible justification for why self-control at the time of lottery
choicesmatters would be that even though actual consumption occurs only later, subjects
make their consumption plan already at the time of the lottery choice (e.g., “If I receive the
€x payoff, I will stop by the cafeteria after leaving the lab and buy myself a piece of cake”).
We follow Fudenberg and Levine (2011) and Fudenberg et al. (2014) in their assessment
of the relevant point in time of self-control when deriving our hypotheses from the simpli-
fied model by Fudenberg et al. (2014).
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Online Appendix A. Categorization of behavior
The switching row in each of the four choice lists measures an individual’s risk atti-
tude. More precisely, differences in expected values of the less risky lottery and its mean-
preserving spread at the switching row measure an individual’s “risk premium” m∼ that
has to be added to the riskier lottery to make that subject indifferent between the two lot-
teries. We calculate this risk premium as the average difference of the expected values in
the two rows around the switching point; i.e., a subject who chooses themore risky lottery
when the difference in expected values is €2.60 but switches to the less risky lottery when
it is €2.50 is assigned a risk premiumm∼ = €2.55.
Based on these indifference-generating risk premia, we classify subjects’ behavior into
four categories: risk-seeking, risk-neutral, risk-averse, and dominated choices. The behav-
ior of subjects whose risk premium is positive is classified as risk-averse, while a risk pre-
mium of zero implies risk neutrality, and a negative risk premium risk proclivity.20 3% of
choices are in favor of the dominated lottery in the first row. They are excluded from the
further analysis, since dominated choices are incompatible with any deterministic model
Table A1
Categorization of behavior.
Depletion Control Combined
Frequency % Frequency % Frequency %
Choice List A: Risky/Risky
Risk-seeking 11 7.2 8 5.1 19 6.2
Risk-neutral 15 9.9 7 4.5 22 7.1
Risk-averse 124 81.6 138 88.5 262 85.1
Dominated choices 2 1.3 3 1.9 5 1.6
Choice List B: Safe/Risky
Risk-seeking 10 6.6 11 7.1 21 6.8
Risk-neutral 12 7.9 10 6.4 22 7.1
Risk-averse 119 78.3 127 81.4 246 79.9
Dominated choices 11 7.2 8 5.1 19 6.2
Choice List C: “Long Shot”
Risk-seeking 70 46.1 72 46.2 142 46.1
Risk-neutral 9 5.9 1 0.4 10 3.3
Risk-averse 68 44.7 75 48.1 143 46.4
Dominated choices 5 3.3 8 5.1 13 4.2
Choice List D: Delayed Payoffs
Risk-seeking 9 5.9 4 2.6 13 4.2
Risk-neutral 9 5.9 8 5.1 17 5.5
Risk-averse 133 87.5 141 90.4 274 89.0
Dominated choices 1 0.7 3 1.9 4 1.3
20 As we observe switching points instead of points of indifference, we cannot technically observe
risk neutrality. We, thus, classify subjects as risk-neutral who switch at or immediately after the risk-
neutral row (m∼ = €0.05 orm∼ =−€0.05). Subjects withm∼ > €0.05 are classified as risk-averse and
subjects withm∼ <−€0.05 as risk-seeking.
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of decision making under risk.21 We decided to abstract from possible stochastic compo-
nents in decision-making since the already rather complex “dual-self” models that we test
abstract from them as well.
Table A1 displays the absolute and relative frequencies of choices in the choice lists.
Online Appendix B. Translated instructions for the deple-
tion [control] group
General explanations
Welcome to this economic experiment.
In the course of this experiment you can earn a nonnegligible amount of money. The ex-
act amount strongly depends on your decisions. So please read the following instructions
carefully! If you have any questions, please raise your hand and we will come to your seat.
During the whole experiment it is not allowed to talk to other participants, to use cell
phones, or to launch any other programs on the computer. Disregarding any of these rules
will lead to your exclusion from the experiment and from all payments.
In principle, the earnings resulting from your decisions will be paid out to you in cash at
the end the experiment. Only in an exceptional case, you will receive your money later,
either in cash or via a bank transfer according to which you choose. (More on that will be
announced in a moment.)
On the following pages, we will describe the exact experimental procedure.
The experiment: your decisions
In this experiment you will make 85 different decisions, each between two alternatives:
A and B. Each of these two alternatives is a lottery. Here is an example of such a lottery:
With a probability of 50% you win €9 and with a probability of 50% you win €12. Winning
probabilities and the amounts in euro that you can win will vary between decisions.
The 85 decisions are summarized in four large tables, with about 20 rows each. Each row
represents one decision. The four tables will be shown to you on four subsequent decision
screens.
This is a decision screen with one such table. This table only serves as an example and is,
therefore, shortened to five rows.
Please choose whether you prefer Alternative A or B for every row by checking the respec-
tive option with your mouse. Alternative B becomes either more or less attractive when
moving from the top to the bottom, depending on the table. Therefore, the respective rows
are filled out automatically, as soon as you have switched from Alternative A to B, or from
Alternative B to A, for the first time.
As long as youhave not hit the “continue” button, you can still change your decisions. Once
you havemade all decisions in one of the large tables, please click the “continue” button in
21 We do not exclude these subjects altogether but just their choices for specific lotteries. Our re-
sults are robust to excluding those subjects altogether.
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Fig. B1. Screenshot of an example choice list (“table”) that subjects were given as part of the written
instructions.
Translation of the depicted table: “Please choose one alternative in each row. Alternative A [first row:]
€4.00 with 50% or €19.00 with 50%. Alternative B [first row:] €7.00 with 50% or €23.00 with 50%.”
the lower right corner of the screen. You will then see the next decision screen containing
another large table.
Your payment from the experiment is determined in a two-step process: In Step 1, one of
your 85decisions (i.e., one row fromone of the four tables)will be drawn randomly. This is
the only decision thatwill affect your payment. Thatmeans you shouldmake your decision
in every single row as if it were your only decision. All decisions are drawn with the same
probability (1/85).
For the drawn decision, it is determined whether you selected alternative A or B. In Step 2
the lottery you have chosen is played, determining your payment. An example: Assume
decision 4 from the table shown above is drawn in Step 1. Alternative B was chosen in deci-
sion 4. In Step 2 it is—according to the lottery—randomly determinedwhether you receive
€5.50 or €21.50. In this example, the payoffs of €5.50 and €21.50 are equally likely (both have
a probability of 50%).
Following those four large tables we will show you additional, smaller tables. The purpose
of those smaller tables is to learn about your decisions in more detail. You will receive
a more detailed description and explanation regarding these tables on your screen during
the course of the experiment.
Further tasks
Before youmake your decision (as described above), there are two additional tasks to
be completed. It is very important for the experiment that youmake an effort to complete
the tasks diligently and correctly. For each task, you will be handed out a sheet of paper
containing text that you should work on. We will collect both sheets of paper at the end
of the experiment. Moreover, you will receive private feedback about your performance in
the two tasks on screen at the end of the experiment.
First task
Youwill receive a first sheet of paper containing text.Please cross out each instance of the
letter “e” (including “E”) in the text. Start the taskwithworking on thefirst paragraph and
continue paragraph by paragraph.
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You have 3 minutes to work on this task. Rather work conscientiously on few paragraphs
than try toworkonmanyparagraphs. The time remaining for the task is shown in theupper
right corner of your screen.
Second task
After having finished the first task, you will receive a second sheet of paper containing text.
Now you have to cross out each instance of the letter “e” according to the following set
of rules:
Generally, you cross out the letter “e”; there are, however, the following exceptions:
(a) there is a vowel in the text after the letter “e”, or
(b) there is a vowel in the text two letters after the letter “e”, or
(c) there is a vowel in the text two letters in front of the letter “e”.
If there is a vowel directly in front of the “e” (as, for instance, in case of “circa elf”), the “e”
is to be crossed out.
In counting letters, disregard full stops, commas, hyphens, or spaces. Vowels comprise: “a”,
“ä”, “e”, “i”, “o”, “ö”, “u”, “ü”.
The following schematic representation summarizes the rules:
_ _ e _ _
1 2 3 4
Cross out all instances of “e” in principle. Exceptions: Do not cross out the “e” if there
is a vowel at position 1, 3, or 4.
As in the first task, please start with the first paragraph and continue paragraph by para-
graph.
Second task [control group]
After having finished the first task, you will receive a second sheet of paper containing text.
Please cross out each instance of the letter “e” (including “E”) in the text again. This is the
same instruction as in the first task. As in the first task, please start with the first paragraph
and continue paragraph by paragraph.
You have 7 minutes to work on this task. Rather work conscientiously on few paragraphs
than try toworkonmanyparagraphs. The time remaining for the task is shown in theupper
right corner of your screen.
Following these two tasks, you will make the 85 decision described previously.
Training and comprehension questions
Before you start working on both tasks, we ask you to answer a few training questions re-
garding the decisions. Answering those questions will make it easier to acquaint yourself
with the decision situation.
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At the end of today’s experiment—following your decisions—there are a few screens with
questions and the like, before the money you earned is paid out.
In case you have any questions—now or while working on the training tasks—please raise
your hand. We will come to your seat to answer your questions.
Please do not ask any questions aloud!
Online Appendix C. German original of the instructions
and text of the depletion task
1 
EXPERIMENT AM 28. OKTOBER 2014 
Allgemeine Erklärungen 
Wir begrüßen Sie herzlich zu diesem wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Experiment. 
Im Rahmen dieses Experiments können Sie eine nicht unerhebliche Summe Geld ver-
dienen. Wie viel Geld Sie verdienen, hängt dabei maßgeblich von Ihren Entscheidungen 
ab. Lesen Sie die folgenden Erklärungen daher bitte gründlich durch! Wenn Sie Fragen 
haben, strecken Sie bitte Ihre Hand aus der Kabine – wir kommen dann zu Ihrem 
Platz. 
Während des Experiments ist es nicht erlaubt, mit den anderen Experimentteil-
nehmern zu sprechen, Mobiltelefone zu benutzen oder andere Programme auf dem 
Computer zu starten. Die Nichtbeachtung dieser Regeln führt zum Ausschluss aus 
dem Experiment und von allen Zahlungen. 
Grundsätzlich bekommen Sie das Einkommen aus Ihren Entscheidungen am Ende die-
ses Experiments bar ausbezahlt. Nur im Ausnahmefall erfolgt die Auszahlung später, 
und zwar wahlweise in bar oder per Banküberweisung. (Näheres dazu erfahren Sie 
gleich.) 
Auf  den nächsten Seiten beschreiben wir den genauen Ablauf  des Experiments. 
Das Experiment: Ihre Entscheidungen 
Sie treffen im Rahmen dieses Experiments 85 verschiedene Entscheidungen zwischen 
jeweils zwei Alternativen: A und B. Jede der zwei Alternativen ist eine Lotterie. Ein Bei-
spiel für eine solche Lotterie ist: Mit einer Wahrscheinlichkeit von 50 % gewinnen Sie 
9 Euro, und mit einer Wahrscheinlichkeit von 50 % gewinnen Sie 12 Euro. Die Gewinn-
wahrscheinlichkeiten und die Euro-Beträge, die Sie gewinnen können, variieren zwi-
schen den verschiedenen Entscheidungen. 
Die 85 Entscheidungen sind in vier großen Tabellen mit jeweils ungefähr 20 Zeilen zu-
sammengefasst. Jede Zeile einer Tabelle entspricht dabei einer Entscheidung. Die vier 
Tabellen werden Ihnen nacheinander auf  vier verschiedenen Entscheidungsbildschir-
men angezeigt. 
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Hier sehen Sie einen Entscheidungsbildschirm mit einer solchen Tabelle. Diese Tabelle 
soll nur als Beispiel dienen und ist daher auf  fünf  Zeilen verkürzt: 
 
Für jede Zeile klicken Sie bitte mit der Maus an, ob Sie Alternative A oder B bevorzu-
gen. Alternative B wird – je nach Tabelle – von oben nach unten immer attraktiver oder 
weniger attraktiv. Daher füllen sich die entsprechenden Zeilen einer Tabelle automa-
tisch aus, sobald Sie einmal von Alternative A zu Alternative B oder einmal von Alter-
native B zu Alternative A gewechselt haben. 
Solange Sie nicht den „Weiter“-Knopf  drücken, können Sie Ihre Entscheidungen noch 
ändern. Sobald Sie alle in einer großen Tabelle zusammengefassten Entscheidungen 
gefällt haben, drücken Sie bitte den „Weiter“-Knopf  unten rechts auf  dem Bildschirm. 
Es wird Ihnen dann der nächste Entscheidungsbildschirm mit einer weiteren großen 
Tabelle angezeigt. 
Ihre Auszahlung aus dem Experiment wird in einem zweischrittigen Prozess bestimmt: 
Im 1. Schritt wird eine Ihrer 85 Entscheidungen (d. h. eine einzige Zeile aus einer der 
vier Tabellen) zufällig ausgelost. Nur diese eine Entscheidung bestimmt Ihre Auszah-
lung. Dies bedeutet, dass Sie Ihre Entscheidung in jeder Zeile so treffen sollten, als 
wäre es Ihre einzige Entscheidung. Alle Entscheidungen werden mit derselben Wahr-
scheinlichkeit (also 1/85) ausgelost. 
Für die ausgeloste Entscheidung wird festgestellt, ob Sie Alternative A oder B ange-
klickt haben. Im 2. Schritt wird nun für die von Ihnen angeklickte Alternative die ent-
sprechende Lotterie ausgespielt und dadurch Ihre Auszahlung bestimmt. 
Ein Beispiel: Nehmen Sie an, dass in der oben abgebildeten Tabelle in Schritt 1 Ent-
scheidung 4 ausgelost wurde. In Entscheidung 4 wurde Alternative B angeklickt. In 
Schritt 2 wird nun ausgelost, ob Sie 5,50 Euro oder 21,50 Euro ausgezahlt be-
kommen. In diesem Beispiel sind die Auszahlungen 5,50 Euro und 21,50 Euro gleich 
wahrscheinlich (beide haben eine Wahrscheinlichkeit von 50 %). 
Nach den vier großen Tabellen werden wir Ihnen noch weitere, kleinere Tabellen vor-
legen. Der Zweck dieser kleineren Tabellen ist, dass wir Ihre Entscheidung noch ge-
nauer erfragen möchten. Die Details hierzu bekommen Sie im Laufe des Experiments 
auf  dem Computerbildschirm angezeigt und erklärt. 
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Ihre weiteren Aufgaben 
Bevor Sie Ihre Entscheidungen – wie oben beschrieben – treffen, haben Sie noch zwei 
Aufgaben zu erledigen. Für das Experiment ist es sehr wichtig, dass Sie die Aufgaben 
gründlich und korrekt bearbeiten.  
Für jede Aufgabe teilen wir ein Blatt mit Text aus, das Sie bearbeiten sollen. Am Ende 
des Experiments sammeln wir beide von Ihnen bearbeiteten Blätter ein. Außerdem 
erhalten Sie am Ende des Experiments auf  dem Computerbildschirm ein privates 
Feedback, wie gut Sie beide Aufgaben bearbeitet haben. 
Erste Aufgabe 
Sie bekommen von uns das erste Blatt mit Text ausgehändigt. Ihre Aufgabe besteht 
darin, in diesem Text sämtliche Buchstaben „e“ (gilt auch für „E“) durchzustreichen. 
Beginnen Sie bitte mit dem ersten Absatz und gehen Sie danach absatzweise vor. 
Insgesamt haben Sie für diese erste Aufgabe 3 Minuten Zeit. Arbeiten Sie lieber gründ-
lich an weniger Absätzen, als mit der Bearbeitung vieler Absätze anzufangen. Oben 
rechts auf  dem Computerbildschirm wird Ihnen die verbleibende Arbeitszeit ange-
zeigt.  
Zweite Aufgabe 
Nachdem Sie die erste Aufgabe erledigt haben, teilen wir ein zweites Blatt mit Text 
aus. Jetzt müssen Sie den Buchstaben „e“ nach folgenden neuen Regeln durch-
streichen: 
Prinzipiell streichen Sie das „e“ durch, allerdings gibt es folgende Ausnahmen: 
a) im Text folgt nach dem „e“ ein Vokal oder 
b) im Text folgt ein Vokal im Abstand von zwei Buchstaben nach dem „e“ oder 
c) im Text steht ein Vokal im Abstand von zwei Buchstaben vor dem „e“. 
Wenn ein Vokal direkt vor dem „e“ steht (wie zum Beispiel im Fall von „zirka elf“), ist 
das „e“ durchzustreichen. 
Bei der Abzählung sind Satzzeichen wie Punkt und Komma sowie Leerzeichen und 
Bindestriche nicht zu beachten. Vokale sind: „a“, „ä“, „e“, „i“, „o“, „ö“, „u“, „ü“. 
Die folgende schematische Darstellung fasst die Regeln zusammen: 
  _ _ e _ _  
 1 2  3 4 
Prinzipiell streichen Sie alle „e“ durch. Ausnahmen: Sie streichen ein „e“ nicht 
durch, wenn auf der Position 1, 3 oder 4 ein Vokal steht. 
Beginnen Sie bitte wieder – wie in der ersten Aufgabe – mit dem ersten Absatz und 
gehen Sie danach absatzweise vor. 
Description of the “second task” in the control group:
3 
Ihre weiteren Aufgaben 
Bevor Sie Ihre Entscheidungen – wie oben beschrieben – treffen, haben Sie noch zwei 
Aufgaben zu erledigen. Für das Experiment ist es sehr wichtig, dass Sie die Aufgaben 
gründlich und korrekt bearbeiten.  
Für jede Aufgabe teilen wir ein Blatt mit Text aus, das Sie bearbeiten sollen. Am Ende 
des Exp riments samm ln wir beide von Ihne  bearbeiteten Blätt r ein. Außerdem 
erhalten Sie am Ende des Experim nts auf  dem Computerbildschirm ein privates 
Feedback, wie gut Sie beide Aufgaben bearbeitet haben. 
Erste Aufgabe 
Sie bekommen von uns das erste Blatt mit Text ausgehändigt. Ihre Aufgabe besteht 
darin, in diesem Text sämtliche Buchstaben „e“ (gilt auch für „E“) durchzustreichen. 
Beginnen Sie bitte mit dem ersten Absatz und gehen Sie danach absatzweise vor. 
Insgesamt haben Sie für diese erste Aufgabe 3 Minuten Zeit. Arbeiten Sie lieber gründ-
lich an weniger Absätzen, als mit der Bearbeitung vieler Absätze anzufangen. Oben 
rechts auf  dem Computerbildschirm wird Ihnen die verbleibende Arbeitszeit ange-
zeigt.  
Zweite Aufgabe 
Nachdem Sie die erste Aufgabe erledigt haben, teilen wir ein zweites Blatt mit Text 
aus. Bitte streichen Sie in diesem Text wieder alle Buchstaben „e“ durch. Dies ent-
spricht der Aufgabenstellung aus der ersten Aufgabe. Beginnen Sie bitte wieder mit 
dem ersten Absatz und gehen Sie danach absatzweise vor. 
Insgesamt haben Sie für diese zweite Aufgabe 7 Minuten Zeit. Arbeiten Sie auch hier 
lieber gründlich an weniger Absätzen, als mit der Bearbeitung vieler Absätze anzu-
fangen. Oben rechts auf  dem Computerbildschirm wird Ihnen die verbleibende Ar-
beitszeit angezeigt. 
Im Anschluss an die beiden Aufgaben treffen Sie Ihre anfangs beschriebenen 85 Ent-
scheidungen. 
Übungsaufgaben und Verständnisfragen 
Bevor Sie mit der Bearbeitung der beiden Aufgaben beginnen, bitten wir Sie, am Com-
puter einige Übungsfragen zu den Entscheidungen zu beantworten. Das Beantworten 
dieser Fragen soll es Ihnen erleichtern, sich mit der Entscheidungssituation vertraut zu 
machen. 
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Insgesamt haben Sie für diese zweite Aufgabe 7 Minuten Zeit. Arbeiten Sie auch hier 
lieber gründlich an weniger Absätzen, als mit der Bearbeitung vieler Absätze anzu-
fangen. Oben rechts auf  dem Computerbildschirm wird Ihnen die verbleibende Ar-
beitszeit angezeigt. 
Im Anschluss an die beiden Aufgaben treffen Sie Ihre anfangs beschriebenen 85 Ent-
scheidungen. 
Übungsaufgaben und Verständnisfragen 
Bevor Sie mit der Bearbeitung der beiden Aufgaben beginnen, bitten wir Sie, am Com-
puter einige Übungsfragen zu den Entscheidungen zu beantworten. Das Beantworten 
dieser Fragen soll es Ihnen erleichtern, sich mit der Entscheidungssituation vertraut zu 
machen. 
Gegen Ende des heutigen Experiments – im Anschluss an Ihre Entscheidungen – folgen 
dann noch einige Bildschirme mit Fragen u. Ä., bevor wir zur Auszahlung des von Ihnen 
verdienten Geldes kommen. 
Falls Sie jetzt Fragen haben oder während der Beantwortung der Übungsfragen Ihrer-
seits Fragen entstehen, halten Sie bitte die Hand aus der Kabine. Ein Leiter des Expe-
riments wird dann an Ihren Platz kommen, um Ihre Fragen zu beantworten. Stellen 
Sie Fragen keinesfalls laut! 
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Aufgabe 1 
Bitte streichen Sie alle Buchstaben „e“ (auch Großbuchstaben „E“) durch. 
Bitte arbeiten Sie 3 Minuten an dieser Aufgabe. 
 
Die Anwendung des statistischen Methodenspektrums auf reale 
Problemstellungen aus Wissenschaft und Praxis bedeutet in der Regel die 
Bearbeitung einer großen Fülle von Primärdaten, die wiederholte Behandlung 
eines Datensatzes mit verschiedenen Methoden oder die mehrmalige 
Anwendung einer Methode auf unterschiedliche Datensätze. Der damit 
verbundene Rechenaufwand ist insbesondere bei den ökonometrischen 
Verfahren und bei der Zeitreihenanalyse sehr  
 
umfangreich und zwingt zum Einsatz elektronischer 
Datenverarbeitungsanlagen. Um Forschern und Praktikern den Einsatz 
statistischer Verfahren zu erleichtern, wurden leistungsfähige Software-
Produkte entwickelt, die einem permanenten Wandel unterliegen. Waren 
früher die Entwicklungen auf Großrechnern dominierend, so gewannen 
inzwischen die Software-Pakete auf Workstations zunehmend an Bedeutung. 
Zum einen wurden mittlerweile fast alle wichtigeren Statistik-Pakete aus  
 
der Großrechnerwelt, wie etwa BMDP, SAS und SPSS für Workstations 
portiert. Zum anderen wurde auch eine große Zahl von neuen Produkten 
speziell für Geräte dieser Klasse entwickelt. Heute existieren für Workstations 
mehrere hundert kommerziell vertriebene Statistik-Pakete und unzählige 
Produkte aus dem Share- und Freewarebereich. Dennoch bleiben nach wie 
vor bestimmte statistische Anwendungen Großrechnern vorbehalten. Man 
kann Statistik-Software grob in Pakete  
 
mit allgemeinem Methodenspektrum und solche für spezielle 
Methodengebiete unterscheiden. Statistik-Pakete mit allgemeinem 
Methodenspektrum verfügen zumeist über univariate deskriptive Statistiken, 
Kreuztabellen, Regressionsrechnung, nichtparametrische Tests, 
Varianzanalyse und Grafiken. Vom Anwender verlangen sie häufig keine 
besonderen Methodenkenntnisse; es genügt im Wesentlichen, sich eine 
leicht erlernbare Steuersprache bzw. die Bedienung einer vorgegebenen  
 
Benutzeroberfläche anzueignen. Diese prinzipiell zu begrüßende einfache 
Handhabbarkeit statistischer Software birgt aber auch Gefahren, die nicht 
übersehen werden dürfen. 
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Aufgabe 2 
Bitte streichen Sie nun nach den neuen Regeln den Buchstaben „e“ 
(auch Großbuchstaben „E“) durch. 
Zusammenfassung der neuen Regeln: Prinzipiell streichen Sie alle „e“ durch. 
Ausnahmen: Sie streichen ein „e“ nicht durch, wenn auf der Position 1, 3 
oder 4 ein Vokal steht: _ _ e _ _ 
 1 2  3 4 
Bitte arbeiten Sie 7 Minuten an dieser Aufgabe. 
  
Gerade weil viele Programme so einfach zu bedienen sind, können sie auch 
von Benutzern mit teils nur rudimentären Statistikkenntnissen eingesetzt 
werden. Über die Voraussetzungen und Implikationen der verwendeten 
Verfahren sowie die angemessene Interpretation der Ergebnisse sind sich 
unerfahrene Anwender oftmals nicht im Klaren. Es steht zu befürchten, daß 
die Verfügbarkeit einfach zu bedienender Statistikprogramme unbedachte 
Auswertungen mit inadäquaten Methoden 
und fragwürdigen Ergebnissen provoziert. Der andere drohende Extremfall ist, 
daß das vom ausgewählten Statistik-Paket abgedeckte Methodenspektrum die 
durchzuführende Untersuchung in dem Sinne vorstrukturiert, daß der 
Anwender nur die von der Software angebotenen Verfahren in Betracht zieht. 
Methoden, die im Hinblick auf das vorliegende Datenmaterial und die zu 
untersuchende Fragestellung unter Umständen geeigneter wären, aber im 
Programm nicht  
 
vorgesehen sind, werden dann a priori ignoriert. Im nachfolgenden Abschnitt 
werden einige gemeinhin als wichtig erachtete Eigenschaften von Statistik-
Paketen erläutert. Aufgrund der Heterogenität des Angebotes wie auch der 
Erfordernisse der Anwender kann ein solcher Anforderungskatalog keinen 
normativen Charakter besitzen. Er ist vielmehr als Entscheidungshilfe zu 
betrachten, die bei der Auswahl eines Statistik-Paketes Hinweise auf 
Qualitätskriterien geben kann.  
 
Oftmals wenig beachtet wird die statistische und numerische Korrektheit 
der von den Programmen generierten Ergebnisse. Bei den Produkten mit 
allgemeinem Methodenspektrum wurde der Schwerpunkt auf 
Programmpakete für Workstations gelegt. Da die angebotenen Produkte und 
ihre Eigenschaften einem ständigen Wandel unterliegen, kann es sich hierbei 
nur um eine Momentaufnahme handeln. Ebenso wenig ist es möglich, 
sämtliche auf dem Markt angebotenen  
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Produkte zu würdigen. Ein Anspruch auf Vollständigkeit wird 
dementsprechend nicht erhoben. Noch viel mehr gilt dies für die erwähnten 
und auf bestimmte Anwendungsgebiete spezialisierten Pakete. Aus der Fülle 
des Angebotes werden nur einige wenige Produkte expressis verbis genannt. 
Die Nennung eines Produktes ist also keineswegs mit einer Wertung 
verbunden. Aufgrund der Unmöglichkeit einer umfassenden Würdigung aller 
verfügbaren Programme ist der nach seinem  
 
Statistik-Paket Suchende auf weiterführende Informationen angewiesen. 
Hinweise zur Beschaffung dieser Informationen, mit besonderer 
Berücksichtigung des Internets, können in diesem Abschnitt gefunden werden. 
Der im Folgenden diskutierte Katalog wünschenswerter Eigenschaften von 
Statistikprogrammen fasst die in der einschlägigen Literatur anzutreffenden 
Forderungen zusammen. In dieser Hinsicht ist er als Minimalkonsens 
anzusehen, der um etliche Kriterien, die für bestimmte  
 
Benutzer oder Anwendungen wichtig sind, ergänzt werden könnte. Auf eine 
Gewichtung der genannten Aspekte wurde bewusst verzichtet. Sie hängt 
entscheidend vom geplanten Einsatzgebiet und den individuellen Präferenzen 
ab und sollte daher von jedem selbst vorgenommen werden. Im Wesentlichen 
können, neben den diskutierten Korrektheitsproblemen, vier Kategorien von 
Kriterien identifiziert werden die bei der Auswahl eines Statistik-Paketes 
berücksichtigt werden  
sollten: Systemvoraussetzungen, Bedienung, Systemschnittstellen und Vielfalt 
der statistischen Verfahren. In die erste Gruppe fallen technische 
Eigenschaften wie unterstützte Hardware in die zweite dagegen Aspekte wie 
Art und Weise der Bedienung oder die Qualität der Handbücher und 
Onlinehilfen. Die dritte Kategorie deckt die Möglichkeiten des 
Datenaustausches sowie der Integration in andere Programmsysteme ab. Und 
die Kernfunktionalität eines Statistikprogrammes,  
 
nämlich der Umfang der angebotenen Verfahren und grafischen 
Darstellungen, wird schließlich im vierten Punkt angesprochen. Die 
Systemvoraussetzungen spezifizieren die Plattform, auf der die betreffende 
Statistik-Software funktionsfähig ist. Unter einer Plattform wird hierbei eine 
konkrete Kombination aus Hardware und Betriebssystem verstanden. 
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